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INTRODUCTION

Medical technology continues to amaze and intrigue society
with seemingly unending advancements in the enhancement and
extension of human life. Rarely, however, does medicine make substantial advances in the promotion of human life, or, for that matter
in any other aspect of the field, without creating corresponding
legal problems. Rather, almost any new medical development introduces additional complex legal and moral entanglements.'
* Keith J. Hey received B.S.C. (1955) and J.D. (1963) degrees from
Creighton University, and an LL.M. from Georgetown University Law Center
in 1969. Mr. Hey is a professor at Thomas M. Cooley Law School.

1. Medical advances in embryo cryopreservation and in vitro fertilization
created a legal dilemma in Australia almost a decade ago when Mario and Elsa
Rios were killed in an airplane accident, leaving no instructions for the use or
disposition of two frozen embryos left at Queen Victoria Medical Hospital in
Melbourne, Australia. ROBERT H. BLANK, REGULATING REPRODUCTION 66
(1990) An ethics commission recommended the embryos be destroyed, but the
recommendation was reversed by the legislature. Id. The embryos were subsequently transferred to the wombs of two adoptive mothers, but both attempts at
pregnancy failed. Id.; David T. Ozar, The Case Against Thawing Unused Frozen
Embryos, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Aug. 1985, at 7, 7.
Two recent cases in the United States were aftermaths of the same technology. In Davis v. Davis, No. 180, 1990 WL 130807 (Tenn. App. Sept. 13, 1990),
iff'd, 842 S.W.2d (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied sub nom. Stowe v. Davis, 113 S. Ct.
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Perhaps no area of medical technology has raised, or continued
to foster, more interest than those advances made in assisted conception 2 and its legal progeny, surrogacy arrangements. 3 The desire
to propagate, to produce and raise genetically related human beings,
is one of the most fundamental instincts of men and women. 4 But,
increasingly, this goal is frustrated as the number of individuals suffering from infertility5 continues to increase. It is estimated that
over two and a half million couples6 in the United States are unable
to conceive a child by natural intercourse due to a defect or defi1259 (1993), the court was faced with resolving custody over frozen embryos in a
divorce setting. On appeal the court granted the divorcing parties joint custody

over the embryos. Id. at *3.Another couple sued to require an embryo bank to
relinquish custody of their frozen embryo being stored in the bank. York v.
Jones Inst., 717 F. Supp. 421, 422-24 (E.D. Va. 1989).
2. Also referred to as "assisted reproduction," "reproductive intervention"
or "collaborative reproduction." See also David Ranii, FutureShock for Family
Law: Can One Child Have 2 Mothers?, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 26, 1984, at 1, 24. "Reproductive technologies" is one of five major areas in which modem medical
science has created problems for judges and lawmakers alike. The other four
are prenatal care and regulation of pregnancy, neonatal treatment decision
making, organ transfer, and refusal of life-continuing medical assistance. Note,
Developments in the Law - Medical Technology and the Law, 103 HARV. L. REV.
1519, 1524 (1990).
3. Until the mid-1980's, discussion of assisted conception and surrogacy issues were, for the most part, relegated to scientific, medical, or legal journals.
Now these topics are of front page interest for more popular forms of journalism. E.g., Rebecca Powers, SPECIAL REPORT, The Baby Business, DET. NEWS,
Sept. 17, 1989, at 1A,1C-4C; Sue Nichols, New Conceptions,LANSING ST. J., Jan.
12, 1986, at 1A.
4. "Becoming a parent is a way of immortalizing yourself, and that's no
small thing." Sue Nichols, New Ways of Conceiving Raise Ethical Questions,
LANSING ST. J., Jan. 15, 1986, at 1B (quoting Tom Tomlinson, Assistant Coordinator for the Medical Humanities Program at Michigan State University).
"[M]ost Americans consider biological parenthood an essential component of a
fulfilled life." Developments in the Law - Medical Technology and the Law,
supra note 2, at 1526. Cf.MARTHA A. FIELD, SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD 25-26
(1988) (regarding the exploitation of women's desires to have children); Sarah
Franklin, Deconstructing "Desperateness": The Social Constructionof Infertility in PopularRepresentationsof New Reproductive Technologies, in THE NEW
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 200, 207, 221 (Maureen McNeil et al. eds., 1990);
Anna Quindlen, Baby Craving, LIFE, June 1987, at 23, 26 (describing "the
desires for progeny [as]... part of a biological system").
5. Infertility is defined as the "inability of a couple to conceive after 12
months of unprotected intercourse." JOHN YEH & MOLLY U. YEH, LEGAL ASPECTS OF INFERTILITY 1 (1991).
6. Tom Yulsman, A Little Helpfor Creation,N.Y. TIMES MAG., Oct. 7,1990,
at 24; Mary E. Barret, Wanted- Baby, USA WEEKEND, Oct. 6-8, 1989, at 4. The
figure has been placed as high as ten million, which constitutes more than fifteen percent of married couples in the United States. Brian J. Carvey, Note,
Where Do the Children Go?- SurrogateMother Contractsand the Best Interests
of the Child, 22 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1187, 1187 (1988). See also Karen M. Sly,
Comment, Baby-Sitting Consideration: Surrogate Mother's Right to "Rent Her
Womb" For a Fee, 18 GONZ. L. REV. 539, 540 (1983) (estimating that one in six
American couples are infertile).
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ciency in one or both of the partners. 7 The defect may be genetic,
caused by an accident or otherwise stem from a myriad of causes in
either the male or female partner.8
Historically, adoption was the alternative for those couples unable to have children, but the length of time required for the regulatory process to function9 and the limited number of adoptable
children, particularly newborn babies, 10 has left a trail of disappointed couples." Moreover, the process of adoption generally involved a child bearing no genetic relationship to either of the
adopting parents. Thus, the basic urge for a genetic connection
within the parent-child relationship was still missing.
During the last quarter of the Twentieth Century medical technology has made a number of techniques available to individuals
7. The incidence of infertility problems are found to be 40% in the male,
40% in the female, and 20% in the two combined. YEH & YEH, supra note 5, at
6-7.

8. Forty percent of women are sterile due to diseased fallopian tubes or
oviducts. In Vitro Fertilization,Embryo Culture, and Embryo Transferin the
Human, in ETHICS ADVISORY BOARD, DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, APPENDIX: HEW SUPPORT OF RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN IN VITRO
FERTILIZATION AND EMBRYO TRANSFER § 8, at 2 (1979). See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, INFERTILITY:
CHOICES 61-82 (1988) [hereinafter OTA REPORT] for a

MEDICAL AND SOCIAL

discussion of both male
and female factors contributing to infertility. Approximately fifty percent of
couples using one or more of the various reproductive techniques were successful in achieving conception. Id.
9. The adoption process generally requires seven years to complete. Note,
SurrogateParenthood- An Analysis of the Problems and a Solution: Representation For the Child, 12 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 143, 146 (1986). The first adoption statute was enacted in Massachusetts in 1851. Yasuhide Kawashima,
Adoption in Early America, 20 J. FAM. LAw 677-78 (1982); YEH & YEH, supra
note 5, at 141-42; Jamil S. Zainaldin, The Emergence of a Modern American
Family Law: Child Custody, Adoption, and the Courts 1796-1851, 73 Nw. U. L.
REV. 1038, 1042-43 (1979) (describing the novelty and impact of the Massachusetts statute). All of the states have some type of regulatory process for adoption with half of these including a provision that prohibits the payment or
exchange of money in connection with adoption. Avi Katz, Comment, Surrogate Motherhood and the Baby-Selling Laws, 20 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PRoBS. 1, 810 (1986); see also Special Project, Legal Rights and Issues Surrounding Conception, Pregnancy, and Birth, 39 VAND. L. REV. 597, 639-40 n.189 (1986) (listing
state statutes which prohibit mothers from receiving compensation for allowing
another to adopt her child); Glenda Thornton, Comment, FloridaSenators Address SurrogateMotherhood, 15 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 885, 892 n.50 (1987) (listing
those states which provide statutory exceptions to the no-payment rule).
10. Two million couples competed for 58,000 babies who were placed for
adoption in 1984, a ratio of over 35 to one. In re Baby M., 525 A.2d 1128, 1137
(N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1987), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 537 A.2d 277 (N.J.
1988). This extreme disparity is not decreasing: the 1987 ratio was three million
couples for 50,000 babies. Quindlen, supra note 4, at 25.
11. The scarcity of children available for adoption has been referred to as
the "adoption famine." Lorraine M. Harding, The Debate on SurrogateMotherhood: The Current Situation, Some Arguments and Issues; Questions Facing
Law and Policy, 1987 J. SOC. WELFARE L. 37, 42 (1987).
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incapable of natural reproduction. 12 The process of in vitro fertilization, 13 perfected in the late 1970s, has been rapidly followed by
developments allowing the cryopreservation of human reproductive
elements' 4 and, later, the transfer of human embryos through uterine lavage and implantation.' 5 Other procedures such as gamete
interfallopian transfer, 16 zygote interfallopian transfer, 17 and micro
manipulation of sperm into ova'" also made genetic reproduction
possible in previously difficult or seemingly impossible situations.
12. Although the term "reproductive technologies" may be used in this article with reference to specific types or processes of facilitating reproduction, a
number of other medical techniques and procedures are also part of the term,
such as amniocentesis, ultrasonography, sex pre-selection, chorionic sampling
and laparoscopy (this list is not exhaustive). THE NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 4, at 2.
13. In vitro fertilization (IVF) is the procedure by which eggs are removed
from a woman's ovaries and fertilized outside her body in a petri dish. BLANK,
supra note 1, at 28. The resulting embryos are kept in a culture medium for
approximately two days until they reach the four to eight-cell stage at which
point they are transferred via catheter into the uterus of the woman. Id.; WARREN FREEDMAN, LEGAL ISSUES IN BIOTECHNOLOGY AND HUMAN REPRODUCTION:
ARTIFICIAL CONCEPTION AND MODERN GENETICS 3-4 (1991). See also Special

Project, supra note 9 (discussing artificial insemination and IVF); see also
Kathryn V. Lorio, In Vitro Fertilizationand Embryo Transfer: FertileAreas of
Litigation, 35 Sw. L.J. 973, 975-78 (1982) (discussing the IVF process and its
history).
14. Freezing sperm has been a recognized procedure for several decades.
Frozen embryos have been successfully implanted since the mid 1980's. GENA
COREA, THE MOTHER MACHINE (1985). Ova (eggs) "quickly lose their viability
when manipulated outside the body" but a medical research team in South Korea has reported success in a major step toward the freezing of eggs. Philip
Elmer-DeWitt, Making Babies, TIME, Sept. 30, 1991, at 56, 61.
15. Embryo transfer could be used to allow the infertile wife to carry the
embryo created by her husband's sperm and a donor ovum or to have the embryo which is created by the ovum of the fertile wife who cannot carry a pregnancy and her husband transferred into a carrier (surrogate). Lorio, supra note
13, at 975-76. For a discussion of cryopreservation, see FREEDMAN, supra note
13, at 10-11; Davis v. Davis, no. 180, 1990 WL 130807, at *1 (Tenn. App. Sept. 13,
1990), aff'd, 842 S.W.2d (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied sub nom. Stowe v. Davis, 113
S. Ct. 1259 (1993); York v. Jones Inst., 717 F. Supp 421, 422-24 (E.D. Va. 1989).
OTA REPORT, supra note 8, at 255, 298.
Embryo transfer following in vitro fertilization may technically fall within
statutes prohibiting embryo research which involves abortion procedures since
the definition of abortion is broad enough to include the flushing process used
in uterine lavage. Lori B. Andrews, The Legal Status of the Embryo, 32 LoY. L.
REV. 357, 397 (1986).
16. "One variation of IVF is gamete intrafallopian transfer (GIFT) in which
sperm and eggs are transferred directly to the fallopian tubes" to be fertilized.
BLANK, supra note 1, at 28; Philip Elmer-DeWitt, A Revolution in Making Babies, TIME, Nov. 5, 1990, at 76; OTA REPORT, supra note 8, at 255, 297.
17. "A second variation of IVF is zygote intrafallopian transfer (ZIFT) in
which the embryo is placed in the fallopian tube about 18 hours after fertilization." BLANK, supra note 1, at 28; Elmer-DeWitt, supra note 16, at 76. See infra
text accompanying notes 51-54 for a more complete description of the GIFT and
ZIFT procedures.
18. BLANK, supra note 1, at 32; OTA REPORT, supra note 8, at 299.
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The increased use of assisted conception processes such as in
vitro fertilization and its medical progeny also greatly increased the
number of those resorting to surrogacy arrangements, those nonmedical agreements whereby a woman would agree to conceive and
give birth to a child for another person.19 In a typical situation the
surrogate would consent, generally in exchange for a substantial
fee, to undergo artificial insemination, in vitro fertilization, or embryo transplantation, in order to carry the resulting fetus to term
and surrender the child immediately following birth.20 The more
19. Barbara S. Parish, Comment, Test Tube on Tria: Let CaliforniaBlaze
the Trail to the Legitimation of Surrogacy, 9 GLENDALE L. REV. 56,57 (1990). A
surrogate mother is a woman appointed to give birth to a child in the place of
another. Special Project, supra note 9, at 632. Surrogate mother means a "female who is naturally or artificially inseminated and who subsequently gestates
a child conceived through the insemination pursuant to a surrogate contract."
MICH. CoMP. LAws § 722.853(h) (West 1991). See also LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 2713 (West 1992); IOWA CODE § 710.11 (Supp. 1993); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 25-218(d) (1991).
For an extensive discussion of surrogacy from a number of different perspectives and positions, see Forum on SurrogateMotherhood, 16 LAW, MED. &
HEALTH CARE 1, 1-2 (1988). Formulation of the issues has not significantly
changed since then although the degree of interest in and literature on the subject has not diminished. E. PETER VOLPE, TEST-TUBE CONCEPTION: A BLEND OF
LOVE AND SCIENCE (1987); June R. Carbone, The Role of ContractPrinciplesin
Determiningthe Validity ofSurrogacy Contracts, 28 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 581
(1988) (arguing that the courts should honor surrogacy agreements using normal contract principles); Keith J. Cunningham, Comment, Surrogate Mother
Contracts: Analysis of a Remedial Quagmire,37 EMORy L.J. 721 (1988) (analyzing possible remedies for breach of surrogacy contracts and arguing for a restrained judicial role in enforcing such agreements); Janet L. Dolgin, Status
and Contract in SurrogateMotherhoo& An Illumination of the Surrogacy Debate, 38 BUFF. L. REV. 515 (1990) (presenting a legislative model for regulation
of commercial surrogacy); Lisa C. Ikemoto, ProvidingProtectionfor Collaborative, Noncoital Reproduction: SurrogateMotherhood and Other New Procreative Technologies and the Right Intimate Association, 40 RUTGERS L. REV. 1273
(1988) (arguing that procreation by surrogate parents is a constitutional right);
Audrey W. Latourette, The SurrogateMother Contract: In the Best Interests of
Society?, 25 U. RICH. L. REV. 53 (1990) (arguing that surrogacy contracts serve
only the best interests of the broker and the buyer); Richard A. Posner, The
Ethics and Economics of Enforcing Surrogate Motherhood, 5 J. CONTEMP.
HEALTH L. & POL'Y 21 (1989) (arguing in favor of finding contracts of surrogate
motherhood enforceable); John A. Robertson, ProcreativeLiberty, and the Control of Conception, Pregnancy and Childbirth,69 VA. L. REv. 405, 420-36 (1983)
(arguing that reproductive rights should not be regulated absent a showing of
tangible harm to the child); Andrea E. Stumpf, Note, Redefining Mother: A
Legal Matrixfor New Reproductive Technologies, 96 YALE L.J. 187 (1986); Stephen G. York, A ContractualAnalysis of SurrogateMotherhood and a Proposed
Solution, 24 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 395 (1991).
20. Objection has been raised over referring to "birth mother" as the "surrogate mother." George J. Annas, Death Without Dignityfor Commercial Surrogacy: The Case of Baby M, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Apr.-May 1988, at 21
(arguing that the "rearing mother" is truly the surrogate and should be referred
to as such). Several definitions of surrogate mother do not include the newer
reproductive technologies of in vitro fertilization and embryo transfer but limit
the arrangement to impregnation through artificial insemination, partially reflecting the almost exclusive use of artificial insemination in early surrogacy
cases. Other definitions attach compensation or some other factor as an ele-
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widely used form of surrogacy, sometimes referred to as "partial
surrogacy," 21 would have the sperm provided by the rearing father
and the child would be given up to the father and his wife.2 2 How23
ever, the sperm could also be provided by an anonymous donor.
The egg as well could be provided by either the rearing mother or
by the surrogate or by a third party donor.24 An arrangement
under which neither of the intended parents is genetically related
to the child may be referred to as a "full surrogacy. ' '25 The ability
of medical science to retrieve, store and implant the life-initiating
cells, coupled with the contractual surrogacy arrangement, has created a variety of combinations for gestational 26 and genetic parents27 of children born as a result of the combination of such
28
medical technology and legal procedures.
ment. See Carvey, supra note 6, at 1189 (describing the exchange of money as
essential to the contract); Katz, supra note 9, at 2 (defining a surrogate mother
as a woman agreeing to be artificially inseminated).
21. Parish, supra note 19, at 57.
22. The sperm-providing father and his wife may be referred to as the rearing parents, intended parents or social parents. Diane M. Bartels, Surrogacy
Arrangements: An Overview, in BEYOND BABY M: ETHICAL ISSUES IN NEW
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNIQUES 173 (Diane M. Bartels et al. eds., 1989) (hereinafter
BEYOND BABY M].

23. The anonymous sperm provider would rarely be involved further and is
generally exempted from paternal liability. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 4(b),

9B U.L.A. 591 (Supp. 1992).
24. For a discussion of various reproductive scenarios, see FREEDMAN, supra
note 13, at 8-12. Donation of ova is becoming a more common practice. An
infertile woman is implanted with an embryo conceived through an in vitro
fertilization procedure from the woman's husband and a donated ovum. This
donation of genetic material could create the same legal implications as those
surrounding sperm donors. Katrine Adams et al., And Donor Makes Three,
NEWSWEEK, Sept. 30, 1991, at 60 (asserting the inevitability that an egg donor
"will eventually sue for parental rights").
25. Parish, supra note 19, at 57. However, recent legislation on surrogacy
arrangements in Virginia and New Hampshire requires either the intended
mother or the intended father to provide a gamete for the embryo. Thus, donation of both ovum and sperm in surrogacy arrangement is precluded. See infra
notes 227 and 241 and accompanying text for the relevant statutory provisions.
Ova donation is particularly attractive for a woman whose age poses serious
problems for the fetus. Christine Gorman, How Old is Too Old?, TIME, Sept. 30,
1991, at 62.
26. The gestational mother is the woman giving birth to the child.
27. The genetic parents would be the male providing the sperm and the
female providing the ovum (egg). With the availability of sperm and ovum donors and the medical technology to utilize the third party elements, the intended social rearing parents may be other than the gestational mother or the
genetic parents. See Annas, supra note 20, at 24; Ranii, supra note 2, at 1. The
non-genetic surrogacy mother arrangement has been referred to as "the second
wave of surrogate mothers." Carol Lawson, Couples' Embryos Used in Birth
Surrogacy, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 1990, at Al.
28. Over 80 gestational surrogacy births were reported in the United States
between 1987 and 1990. More than 2,000 traditional surrogate births were reported during the same period with over 4,000 since the late 1970's. Lawson,
supra note 27, at Al. A Detroit newspaper article noted there were sixteen
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Although medical science was developing the procedures enabling many individuals to consider assisted reproduction techniques and arrangements, the idea of producing a child through one
of the assisted conception procedures was often challenged as being
contrary to the ethical or religious beliefs of many individuals and
couples. 29 Beyond that issue, the idea of a woman agreeing in advance of her child's birth to go through the childbearing process and
then surrender her child to another person or couple runs contrary
30
to concepts of the family as perceived by many in today's society.
The ever-expanding combination of assisted conception techniques
and contractual surrogacy arrangements has created a raft of legal
problems for the courts and legislatures, not merely in the United
States but throughout the world.3 1 How should a society deal with
these latest chapters in the continuing saga of assisted conception?
Should in vitro fertilization, embryo transplantation, and other fertility techniques be regulated by society? Should surrogacy arrangements be condemned, condoned or controlled? A study of
legislation and court decisions in the United States, Great Britain
and Australia3 2 reflects a broad range of positions on assisted conception and surrogacy, sometimes presented in simplistic fashion
different methods for making a baby. The Baby Business, DET. NEWS, Sept. 21,
1989, at 1D.
Not all cases of infertility are alleviated by the medical technologies. A
cause of infertility is never found in one out of five couples. Gary Ellis, Ihfertility and the Role of the FederalGovernment, in BEYOND BABY M, supra note 22,
at 111.
29. William J. Wagner, The New Reproductive Technologies and the Law: A
Roman CatholicPerspective,4 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 37, 58-70 (1988)
(arguing in favor of the Catholic Church's stance on new reproductive technology and recommending legislative and policy guidelines in accordance with Roman Catholic traditions and Church doctrine); FREEDMAN, supra note 13, at 9899 (discussing Roman Catholic and Jewish attitudes on assisted reproduction).
For an interesting discussion of the various concerns and positions of specific religious commentators, see Baruch Brody, CurrentReligious Perspectives
on the New Reproductive Techniques, in BEYOND BABY M, supra note 22, at 45.
See also Lorio, supra note 13, at 978-84 (for a discussion and responses to the
propriety of in vitro fertilization by theologians and philosophers in the 1970's).
See also Excerpts from Instructions on Respect for Human Life in its Origin
and on the Dignity ofProcreation,Vatican Congregation for the Doctrine of the
Faith, Mar. 1987, in BEYOND BABY M, supra note 22, at 277-83.
30. LoRI B. ANDREWS, BETWEEN STRANGERS: SURROGATE MOTHERS, ExPECTING FATHERS, AND BRAVE NEW BABIES at x-xv (1989); Ruth Macklin, Arti-

ficial Means of Reproduction and Our Understandingof the Family, HASTINGS
CENTER REP., Jan.-Feb. 1991, at 5-11 (discussing the philosophical probems associated with artifical means of conception); see also FREEDMAN, supra note 13, at
88, 98-99 (regarding Jewish law and attitudes).
31. See BLANK, supra note 1, at 148-149, 156-157, for a survey of international response to artificial insemination and reproductive technologies. See
also OTA REPORT, supra note 8, at 176.
32. The inclusion of Australia in this article reflects the pioneer position of
that country in reproductive procedures and legislation on those procedures,
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and other times stated in varying degrees of sophistication. Which
approach is the more appropriate? Is there a "right" answer?
It is the position of this author that the piecemeal attempts to
resolve issues on assisted conception and surrogacy arrangements
have merely touched the tip of the extremely sensitive and multifaceted problems created by these new reproductive technologies.
A careful analysis of court decisions and enacted legislation in the
United States, while inconsistent in results, reflects substantial consistency in the lack of understanding or mere avoidance of the interrelated problems inherent in assisted conception and its legal
step-child, the surrogacy arrangement. 33 In many jurisdictions the
paucity of laws to regulate assisted reproduction or surrogacy has
the effect of merely moving the problem through the legal process
one small piece at a time, much like a youth kicking a tin can down
a country road. Reaction is highly selective, more often than not
because the issue is being chosen by the confines of litigation or by
public outcry. 34 One or more elements within this complex problem initiated by new medical advances is supposedly resolved without addressing the entire problem. 35
What is needed is a
including surrogacy. Great Britain is included both for its somewhat different
approach in an English-speaking country and for our common law heritage.
The author's selection of these countries should not be construed as allinclusive. Issues of assisted reproduction and surrogacy are being faced in one
fashion or another by almost every country. See Medicine, Morality, & Culture:
InternationalBioethics, HASTINGS CENTER REP., July-Aug. 1989, at 1, 1-31 (special supp.) (presenting a selection of internaitonal medical issues); International Perspective on Biomedical Ethics, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Aug. 1988, at
1, 1-32 (special supp.) (surveying contemporary biomedical issues of different
countries); Karen H. Rothenberg, Gestational Surrogacy and the Health Care
Provider: Put Part of the IVF Genie Back into the Bottle, 18 LAW, MED. &
HEALTH CARE 345, 346-47 (1990) (discussing international developments in the
wake of Baby M-most laws require that the legal mother be the birth mother
and render most surrogacy contracts unenforcealbe or illegal); OTA REPORT,
supra note 8, at 329-63 (listing the countries that are addressing the matter of
noncoital reproduction).

33. See infra text accompanying notes 130-132 and notes 165-186 for a comparison of the state legislation on surrogacy arrangements.
Advocating a comprehensive approach to reproductive technology may
seem somewhat of a Goliathin challenge when 40% of the states do not have
legislation on artificial insemination which declares the consenting husband of
the woman who was inseminated to be the legal father of the child. See inkfra
note 45; Lori B. Andrews, The Stork Market: The Law of the New Reproduction
Technologies, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1984, at 50, 53.
34. Three early cases in Michigan reacted in a negative fashion to surrogacy
contracts or elements of the surrogacy arrangement without ever reaching a
decision of precedence on the legality of surrogacy arrangements. See infra
text accompanying notes 62-65 and 70-79.
35. Admittedly, judicial response must be limited to issues presented by the
litigation and necessary for adjudication. This restriction merely enforces the
position that the courts are inappropriate fora to resolve the complex issues of
facilitating reproduction and surrogacy. See concluding comments in In re
Baby M, 525 A.2d 1128 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1987), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988) and In re Adoption of Baby Girl L.J., 505
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comprehensive analysis and statutory enactment covering all of the
various medical and legal aspects of assisted conception and surrogacy arrangements. Similar to the need in the commercial law field
almost a half century ago for enactment of a Uniform Commercial
Code 36 to consolidate and coordinate the various phases of commercial law, reproductive technology desperately needs a truly uniform
code to provide guidance for individuals and institutions involved in
the process, and, more particularly, to protect those voiceless infants who will be born by virtue of such technology and/or contrac37
tual arrangements.
I.

HISTORY OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION

The dawning of a new era in facilitating human reproduction
began a scant fifteen years ago with the astonishing news of Baby
Louise's birth in Great Britain through the process known as in vitro fertilization. 38 Ovum and sperm were combined in a petri dish
rather than in the female fallopian tube. The resulting embryo was
then implanted in the woman's uterus and a normal pregnancy and
birth process ensued. With the advent of in vitro fertilization, genetic parenthood became available to women capable of bearing a
child but not capable of conceiving a child in utero.
Although the in vitro fertilization process introduced an entirely new procedure for assisting human reproduction, it was not
the first method for aiding childless couples. Artificial insemination (AI) with sperm provided either by the intended father, called
artificial insemination homologous (AIH), or by an anonymous donor, called artificial insemination heterologous (AID), or through a
combination of sperm (CAI), has been used for over 200 years to
N.Y.S.2d 813 (1986), with both decisions agreeing that the courts are an inappropriate forum.

36. UCC, 1-5 U.L.A. (1989).
37. In vitro fertilization has produced 20,000 children between 1978 and
1990. Elmer-Dewitt, supra note 16, at 76. Future IVF babies are projected at
the rate of 6,000 per year. OTA REPORT, supra note 8, at 293.
38. Louise Joy Brown was born in Oldham, England on July 25, 1978. LESLEY BROWN & JOHN BROWN, OUR MIRACLE CHILD CALLED LOUISE 134, 166-71
(1979). A concise background discussion of the research conducted by Drs.
Steptoe and Edward on in vitro fertilization prior to their success with the birth
of baby Louise in 1978 can be found in Antionette Sedillo Lopez, Test Tube Babies, Surrogate Mothers, Frozen Embryos: Searchingfor Solutions, 20 N.M. L.
REV. 701, 707 (1990); Lorio, supra note 13, at n.2.
The first American baby conceived in vitro was Samantha Steel, born in

England on October 2, 1981. Lorio, supra,note 13, at 975. The first IVF birth in
the United States took place on December 28, 1981. Elizabeth Jordan Carr was
born in the Norfolk (VA) General Hospital on that date. Sharon Begley & John
Carey, How Human Life Begins, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 11, 1982, at 47.
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counteract certain reproductive process difficulties. 3 9 The first successful human artificial insemination was reported in 1790.40 The
first successful procedure in the United States took place in 186641
with the first donor artificial insemination in 1884.42 The use of
donor sperm created its own set of legal problems as several early
court decisions held that artificial insemination by a donor was
adulterous conduct and the sperm donor was the father of the illegitimate child even though the husband had given his consent to the
insemination. 43 Later cases rejected the adulterous conduct position 44 and today state legislation on artificial insemination, adopted
in twenty-five states, generally includes a provision declaring the
semen donor not to be the legal father of the child. 45 Little public
attention has been given to this less dramatic method of facilitating
human reproduction by artificial insemination and yet it remains
the most widely used procedure for such facilitation. Last year, in
the United States alone, over 65,000 births were the result of artifi46
cial insemination.
The advances of medical technology to assist reproduction did
not stop with the development of in vitro fertilization but has
moved forward in dramatic fashion to provide further assistance to
eager potential parents. In 1984 an embryo was frozen for two
months in Australia and then successfully implanted into a surro39. Jeffrey M. Shaman, Legal Aspects of Artificial Insemination,18 J. FAM.
L. 331, 331 n.1 (1980) (the first use of artificial insemination on an animal was an
Arabian horse in the 14th century); FREEDMAN, supra note 13, at 23-27.
40. Shaman, supra note 39, at 331.
41. Id at 331 n.1. See also SHERMAN SILBER, HOW TO GET PREGNANT 174
(1980).
42. ELIZABETH NOBLE, HAVING YOUR BABY BY DONOR INSEMINATION 87

(1987).
43. Gursky v. Gursky, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1963) (holding that
the child was not legitimate and AID constituted adultery); Anonymous v.
Anonymous, 246 N.Y.S.2d 835 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1964) (finding that husband had a
duty to support a child conceived through wife's artificial insemination, only
because there was a specific written agreement for such support); Doornbos v.
Doornbos, 23 U.S.L.W. 2308 (1954), appeal dismissed, 139 N.E.2d 844 (1956) (declaring a child conceived through artificial insemination illegitimate); Orford v.
Orford, 58 D.L.R. 25 (Ont. 1921).
44. R. S. v. R. S., 670 P.2d 923 (Kan. App. 2d 1983); People v. Sorenson 437
P.2d 495 (Cal. 1968); Strnad v. Strnad, 78 N.Y.S.2d 390 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1948); K.S.
v. G. S., 182 N.J. Super. 102 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1981). In L. v. L., All E.R.
141, 146 (1949), a wife was granted an annulment based on incapacity even
though she had conceived a child through AIH.
45. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5(a), 9B U.L.A. at 301 (Supp. 1993). Eighteen
states have adopted the Uniform Parentage Act. Id. Other states' legislation
may vary in certain details but would include similar provisions that the husband and not the sperm donor would be treated as the natural father of the
child conceived through artificial insemination.
46. Warren Cohen et al., The Year Was: 1992, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.;
Dec. 1992, at 96.
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gate.47 A normal pregnancy and birth resulted. 48 Only two years
later, and half a continent away, the first child produced by embryo
transfer was announced in Los Angeles. 49 The embryo conceived
by the sperm of an infertile woman's husband and the ovum of a
second woman was transplanted into the infertile woman, who later
gave birth to a healthy baby.5°
Even more sophisticated advances have expanded the type and
number of procedures used in assisting conception, substantially increasing the chances of successful implantation in transferring
sperm and ovum. A more recent procedure is gamete inter-fallopian transfer (GIFT) in which ovum and sperm are placed in the
fallopian tube with an air bubble separating them.5 ' Fertilization
would then take place in the fallopian tube as in a normal pregnancy rather than ex utero as in the in vitro fertilization procedure.
In a modification of the GIFT procedure, ovum and sperm are combined before being placed in the fallopian tube. Fertilization takes
place ex utero and the resulting single cell zygote is placed in the
fallopian tube. This procedure is called zygote intra-fallopian trans52
fer (ZIFT).
The accumulation of ever-expanding medical procedures for assisting human reproduction enabled many additional individuals
and couples to circumvent certain "problems" in the process of furthering genetic parenthood. The effect of endremitriosis, blocked
or scarred fallopian tubes, sterility, ovulation problems, low sperm
count, genetic diseases, or other causes of infertility could often be
alleviated. 53 Depending on the type of medical problem preventing
in utero pregnancy, a genetic relationship for both rearing parents
could be made possible. 54 The Baby Louise birth is such an example whereby the husband and wife provide the genetic materials
and the petri dish served as the facilitating vessel.
47. Andrews, supra note 33, at 50.
48. Id.
49. Id. The first child born using a combination of in vitro fertilization and
embryo transfer was Candice Elizabeth Reed in Australia in June 1980. Lopata
et al., Pregnancy Following IntrauterineImplantation of an Embryo Obtained

by In Vitro Fertilizationof a Preovulatory Egg, 33

FERTILITY

&

STERILITY

117

(1980).

50.
51.
52.
53.

Lopata, supra note 49.
See Elmer-DeWitt, supra note 16, at 76; BLANK, supra note 1, at 28.
BLANK, supra note 1, at 28.
The listed factors are the major contributors to human infertility. Ellis,

supra note 28, at 112.
54. For the parents of Baby Louise, the inability to conceive through coital
reproduction was due to blocked fallopian tubes. This problem was circumvented by removal of oocytes from Baby Louise's mother, which were combined
with her father's sperm in an in vitro fertilization process. The ensuing embryo

was then implanted in Baby Louise's mother. BROWN & BROWN, supra note 38.
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In other situations, medical science could provide the means for
a genetic relationship between the child and one of the rearing parents. The fertile husband's sperm could be combined with a donor
ovum either through in vitro fertilization or artificial insemination.
The fertile wife's ovum could be combined with donor sperm in
similar fashion. If the infertility problem involved the child-bearig capabilities of the woman, a substitute uterus would be necessary to carry the embryo. For all its miracles in providing relief for
childless couples, science has not provided a substitute for the carriage and development of the embryo. However, even if there is no
substitute for a human uterus for the development of the embryo, it
still seems possible that a substitute human uterus could be used to
facilitate the child-bearing process. If ovum could be provided by a
third party and sperm could similarly be donated, a human uterus
could be provided by another person. The issue raised was no
longer a matter of medical technology or scientific research, but
rather a legal issue in arranging for the substitute uterus. Medicine
in all its sophistication now gave way to the law, and more particu55
larly the law of private contracts.
II.

EARLY SURROGACY DEVELOPMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES

For many individuals the question of surrogacy contracts was
easily answered in the affirmative. Surrogacy arrangements allowed childless couples to have a child genetically related to one or
both of the rearing parents.5 Others envisioned a host of societal
issues reflecting concern for all parties involved, more particularly
for the surrogate who would be giving up her rights to her child and
for the child to be conceived and born under potentially litigious
and psychologically threatening circumstances.5 7 In the early period of surrogacy contracts there were no "laws" as such to regulate
the arrangements set up between couples who desired a child genetically related to the father and women willing to be artificially inseminated and carry the resulting embryo through pregnancy and
55. Surrogacy contracts should not be exclusively a matter of private contracts. The state's interest in protecting the child to be born necessitates intervention to some extent, whether to regulate or to prohibit. See infra text
accompanying notes 162-178 and 187-209 for various models of legislation on
surrogacy.
56. There is no absolute requirement that the child be genetically related to
one or both of the rearing parents. Both could be biologically unrelated to the
child. However, there is little rationale for a surrogacy arrangement unless
some genetic relationship is possible.

The definition of "surrogacy" under the New Hampshire statute would not
include the double donor (i.e., sperm and egg) illustration. N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 168-B:17 (Supp. 1992).

57. See In re Baby M, 525 A.2d 1128 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1987), off'd in
part, rev'd in part, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988); In re Adoption of Baby Girl L.J.,
505 N.Y.S.2d 813 (1986).
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birth. 58 A number of centers in the United States began the matching process between childless couples and women capable and willing to become surrogates.5 9 Contracts to regulate the relationship
were quickly developed. 6° Michigan became a focal point for surrogacy arrangements in the United States due to the work of Noel
Keane, a Southfield, Michigan, lawyer who became one of the early
specialists in the surrogacy contract field.6 ' The first surrogacy contract was executed in Michigan in 1976.62
As the early situs for surrogacy arrangements, it is logical that
the Michigan courts were called upon to test various aspects of surrogacy contracts, albeit in a peripheral fashion. In the 1981 case Doe
v. Kelley,63 the contracting couple in a surrogacy contract challenged provisions of the Michigan adoption statues which prohibited the payment of money or other consideration to the mother for
the release of parental rights or for an adoption. The adoption statute was upheld at the trial level and affirmed on appeal. The court
focused on the compensation phase of the statute, noting that the
statute did not prohibit the couple from having their child through
a surrogacy arrangement.64 The court did not, however, directly
65
rule on the validity of surrogacy contracts.
While the Michigan courts were resolving Doe v. Kelley, 66 a bill
was introduced in the Michigan legislature to allow surrogate
parenting arrangements for compensation. 67 The bill, proposed by
Representative Richard Fitzpatrick, was never reported out of committee.68 Seven years passed before the Michigan Legislature enacted a bill on surrogacy arrangements. The enacted legislation in
58. NOEL KEANE & D. BREo, THE SURROGATE MOTHER 32 (1981).
59. One hundred and sixty-nine centers treating infertility were identified
in 1988. OTA REPORT, supra note 8, at 157.
60. See In re Baby M, 525 A.2d at 1128.
61. Keane is referred to as the "father" of surrogate motherhood. ANDREWS, supra note 30, at 16.
62. The first compensated surrogate mother was Elizabeth Kane in 1980.
KEANE & BREO, supra note 58, at 53; ELIZABETH KANE, BIRTH MOTHER: THE
STORY OF AMERICA'S FIRST LEGAL SURROGATE MOTHER 53 (1988).

63. 307 N.W.2d 438 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1183 (1983).
64. Id. at 441.
65. For a discussion of Doe v. Kelly and other Michigan decisions, see Comment, SurrogateParentingin Michigan, 5 COOLEY L. REV. 747, 752 (1988).
66. 307 N.W.2d 438.
67. H.R. 5184, 81st Leg., 1981 Mich. Legis. Serv. 2440 (West). Alaska was
the first state legislature to have a bill on surrogate motherhood introduced.
COREA, supra note 14, at 225. Michigan was the second state to have a bill on
surrogate motherhood introduced with House Bill 5184. H.R. 5184.
68. Rep. Fitzpatrick would introduce bills regulating alternative reproduction techniques and allowing surrogacy arrangements in subsequent legislative
sessions without success. H.R. 4114, 82d Leg., 1983 Mich. Legis. Serv. 647
(West); H.R. 4554, 83d Leg., 1985 Mich. Legis. Serv. 160 (West); H.R. 4555, 83d
Leg., 1985 Mich. Legis. Serv. 160 (West).
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1988, contrary to the Fitzpatrick efforts, criminalized compensated
69
surrogacy agreements.
Two years after the Doe v. Kelley decision had raised, but
avoided, the basic question of whether surrogacy contracts were
valid, the Michigan Supreme Court was called upon to rule on a
surrogacy contract. In Syrkowski v. Appleyard,70 the genetic father
in a surrogacy arrangement had filed for a court order to have his
name placed on the birth certificate of his child who had a surrogate
mother. If his name was not listed, then by Michigan law the hus71
band of the surrogate mother would be listed as the child's father.
The genetic father's request had been made pursuant to Michigan's
Paternity Act. 72 The surrogate mother did not contest the genetic
father's request, but the State Attorney General challenged the
court's jurisdiction to hear the matter. The trial court ruled against
the father, holding that the Paternity Act was not intended to resolve issues of legitimacy resulting from surrogacy contracts. 73 Relying on Doe v. Kelley, the court held the surrogacy contract to be
against public policy. 74 In affirming the trial court's decision the

Michigan Court of Appeals ruled only on the jurisdictional issue,
yet it too did not assert any public policy argument. 75 The Michigan
Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals on the jurisdictional
issue, but also did not rule on the public policy declaration of the
trial court.76 This absence of a direct ruling in the Syrkowski v.
Appleyard decision left the validity of surrogacy contracts in Michi77
gan highly questionable, but still not declared invalid.
69. MICH. CoMp. LAws ANN. § 25.248(157) (West 1993). The bill criminalizing surrogacy arrangements was introduced by Senator Binsfeld in 1987 and
approved by the legislature in 1988. S. 228, 84th Leg., Reg. Sess., 1987 Mich.
Legis. Serv. 883.
70. 333 N.W.2d 90 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983), rev'd, 362 N.W.2d 211 (Mich. 1985).
71. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 333.2824 (West 1993).
72. Id. § 722.711 (West 1993).

73. 333 N.W.2d 90, 92 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983).
74. Id. at 92.
75. I& at 94.
76. 362 N.W.2d 211, 213 (Mich. 1985). The Michigan Court of Appeals responded that "[tihe courts should not be called upon to enlarge the scope of the
Paternity Act to encompass circumstances never contemplated thereby."
Syrkowski v. Appleyard, 333 N.W.2d at 94. The reluctance of the court to expand the jurisdiction of a statute was a view espoused by the early surrogacy
decisions in Kentucky and New York but totally rejected in the Baby M decision. See infra text accompanying notes 80-87 for a discussion of the Surrogate
Parentingdecision in Kentucky and the Baby Girl L.J. case in New York.
77. Several decisions in other jurisdictions also peripherally involved the
validity of surrogate mother contracts. In re R.K.S., 10 FAM. L. REP. (BNA)
1383 (D.C. Super Ct. 1984) (requiring a report on a surrogate mother contract
before approving an adoption); Sherwyn & Handel v. Cal. State Dep't. of Social
Serv., 218 Cal. Rptr. 778 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (challenging adoption and artificial
conception statutes that threatened the validity of surrogacy arrangements).
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A later Michigan decision, Yates v. Keane,78 directly declared
surrogate contracts to be against public policy and, hence, unenforceable. However, the circuit court judge's ruling came during a
hearing on a motion for summary judgment and the case was later
settled without appeal. 79 As a decision only at the circuit court
level, the declaration on surrogacy contracts carried no precedential
weight outside that specific judicial circuit.
Two other state court decisions in 1986, one from New York
and the other from Kentucky, declared that surrogacy contracts,
while voidable, were not in violation of state adoption statutes
prohibiting payments in connection with an adoption. In Surrogate
ParentingAssociates, Inc. v. Commonwealth,8° the State of Kentucky brought suit to revoke the charter of a corporation operating
a clinic which was involved in surrogacy arrangements. The court
rejected the state's assertion that the corporation's actions violated
Kentucky's baby-selling legislation. The court recognized that
there were fundamental differences between surrogacy arrangements and the buying and selling of babies. 8 ' Furthermore, the
court noted that the legislature, not the judiciary, was empowered
82
to articulate state public policy regarding health and welfare.
Several months later a New York decision, In re Adoption of
Baby Girl L.J.,8 3 cited the SurrogateParentingcase in approving an
uncontested adoption proceeding brought by a contracting couple in
a surrogacy arrangement. The court expressed its reservations regarding surrogacy contracts, but, as in the Kentucky Surrogate
Parentingdecision, the court felt that the legislature was the appropriate forum in which to address the legality of surrogacy contracts.84 The New York adoption statute, precluding payment of
money to the mother, was held inapplicable because the court
found a fundamental difference between baby-selling, as contemplated by the adoption statues, and monetary payment to the
mother under a surrogacy contract.8 5 Inasmuch as the issue of the
surrogacy contract arose in the context of an adoption proceeding,
78. Gratiot County Circuit Court, 9758, 9772 (Jan. 21, 1988).
79. Id. at 9778.
80. 704 S.W.2d 209 (Ky. 1986). For an extensive discussion of Doe v. Kelly,
Syrkowski v. Appleyard, and SurrogateParentingAssociates, Inc. v. Commonwealth, as well as several early State Attorney General opinions, see Katz,
supra note 9, at 25-34.
81. SurrogateParenting,704 S.W.2d at 210.
82. Id
83. 505 N.Y.S.2d 813 (1986). It is interesting to note that most of the early
cases on surrogacy did not involve a private litigator against a defaulting party,
but were challenges with the state as a party to the litigation, often in connection with an adoption proceeding.
84. Id. at 817-18.
85. Id. at 818.
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the contract could have been avoided if any of its provisions violated
the state adoption statutes.8 6 With other states having similar adoption statutes which prohibit compensation or payment of fees to the
mother, the SurrogateParentingand Baby GirlL.J. decisions could
arguably have formed a strong precedent against using the adoption
statutes to regulate surrogacy contracts except as to any direct conflict between the two.8 7 A segment of this precedent was shortlived as the effect of SurrogateParentingwas negated by the passing of a statute in Kentucky which prohibits compensation for surrogacy arrangements and declares any contract made in violation of
88
the statute to be void.
A more recent family court decision in New York, In re Adoption of Paul,8 9 rejected the approach used in Baby GirlL.J. and approved the reasoning and conclusion of the New Jersey Supreme
Court in Baby M. 90 The court in Adoption of Paul looked to the
New York adoption statutes and found that compensation to the
surrogate in exchange for her giving up her child for adoption violated both the adoption laws and the state public policy against trafficking in children.9 1
III.

DEVELOPMENTS IN AUSTRALIA AND GREAT BRITAIN

As courts and legislatures in the United States were struggling
with the surrogacy contract issue in the mid-1980s, Australia and
Great Britain were taking direct action on the issue of surrogacy
and its medical step-parent, in vitro fertilization. The two procedures, one legal and the other medical, were considered to be related issues in legislative action taken by the State of Victoria in
86. I&
87. The Michigan Court of Appeals decision in Syrkowski v. Appleyard
could also have been used as part of that precedent. See supra note 76 and
accompanying text.
88.

Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17-199.590 (Baldwin 1993).

89. 550 N.Y.S.2d 815 (N.Y. Faro. Ct. 1990).
90. In re Baby M, 525 A.2d 1128 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1987), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part, 537 A.2d 1277 (N.J. 1988).
91. In re Adoption of Paul,550 N.Y.S.2d at 817. The court did state it would
accept the surrogate's termination of parental rights on the condition that both
parties provided sworn affidavits that compensation would neither be offered or
accepted in exchange for surrendering the child. Id, at 818-19.
The Baby Girl L.J. decision did not ignore the New York adoption statutes
but found the surrogacy arrangements to be merely voidable, not void. In re
Adoption of Baby Girl L.J., 505 N.Y.S.2d 813, 817 (N.Y. Surrogate's Ct. 1986).
The New York position on the questionable validity of surrogacy contracts
was firmed up when the legislature approved and Governor Cuomo signed into
effect on July 17, 1992, Senate Bill 1906 declaring surrogate parenting contracts
void as against public policy, and establishing civil and criminal penalties for the
payment or receipt of compensation in a surrogate parenting contract. N.Y.
LAW §§ 121-124 (McKinney 1993).
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Australia. 92
Investigation in Victoria had begun in 1982 with the establishment of a government committee to consider the social, ethical, and
legal issues arising from embryonic fertilization. 93 The activities of
this committee, chaired by Professor Louis Waller of the Faculty of
Law at Monash University, resulted in the formulation and subse94
quent adoption of the Infertility Medical Procedures Act of 1984.
This Act regulated the use of in vitro fertilization (IVF) denoting "approved procedures" and limited the availability of the IVF
procedure to married couples. 95 The Act also imposed criminal
sanctions for the solicitation of individuals for surrogate contracts,
and for the giving or receiving of money in conjunction with such
contracts. 96 Any agreement whereby a woman agreed to act as a
surrogate mother was declared void by the statute. 97 Legislation on
surrogate contracts in other Australian states similarly declared
surrogacy contracts to be void and attached criminal sanctions
for solicitation of individuals or compensation for surrogacy
98
contracts.
Administrative regulations governing the performance of in vitro fertilization procedures under the Victoria statute went into effect in July of 1988. 99 Stringent record keeping and documentation
is required of those hospitals and counsellors designated and approved for IVF procedures by the state. 0 0
While the form of legislation on surrogacy contracts adopted by
the state of Victoria might be challenged in some circles as over
92. Victoria Infertility (Medical Procedures) Act, 1984, No. 10163 (Austl.).
93. Peter Singer, Making Laws in Making Babies, HASTINGS CENTER REP.,
Aug. 1985, at 1, 5-6.
94. See Victoria Infertility (Medical Procedures) Act, 1984 (stating that it is
"[a]n act relating to the regulation of certain procedures for the alleviation of
infertility or to assist conception.., to prohibit agreements relating to surrogate motherhood and for other purposes.").
95. Id. §§ 10(3)(a), 11(3)(a), 12(3)(a), and 13(3)(a). However the statutory
definition of "married woman" includes a woman "living with a man as his wife
on a bonafide domestic basis .... ." Id. § 3(2)(a). The Act separates IVF procedures into four different categories with separate provisions for each: IVF-no
donors, IVF-male donors, IVF-female donors, and IVF-male and female donors.
The Act allowed donation of an unused embryo to another married woman and
her husband. Id § 13(8).
96. Id. § 30(2) (Part V).
97. Id. § 30(3).
98. E.g., Family Relationship Amendment Act, 1988 (S. Austl.); 1988
(Queensland, Austl.).
99. HuM. RTS. L. REP. 114 (Mar-Apr. 1989).
100. See Victoria Infertility Act § 7 (describing the required approval of hos-

pitals); Id. § 9 (describing the requisite approval of counsellors); Id. § 19 (detailing the records to be kept by approved hospitals); Id. § 21 (identifying the

record keeping requirements for artificial insemination procedures carried out
by a medical practitioner outside an approved hospital).
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reactive by attaching criminal sanctions to the solicitation and compensation aspects of surrogacy arrangements, the more fundamental point to be recognized is that positive action was taken to
regulate a serious medical, social, and legal problem. Furthermore,
by combining regulation of the IVF medical procedures with regulation of the surrogacy arrangements resulting from the IVF procedures, Victoria had dealt with both cause and effect, the medical
technology and the legal arrangement.' 0 '
The birth of Great Britain's first commercial surrogate baby in
January of 1985 met with overwhelming public disapproval and resulted in the adoption of the Surrogacy Arrangements Act 1985.102
The Act spoke only to commercial surrogacy, making it a crime for
third parties to benefit from such arrangements. 0 3 Baby Cotten,
the child in the center of the furor, became a ward of the court;
however, the natural father and his wife were given custody and
later allowed to take Baby Cotten out of Britain. 0 4 More recently,
Great Britain has enacted comprehensive legislation regulating
0 5
other aspects of assisted reproduction.
IV.

ASSISTED CONCEPTION LEGISLATION IN THE UNITED STATES

At the time, Australia was becoming the first to adopt comprehensive regulations on assisted conception and surrogacy, as little
statutory regulation or judicial declarations existed on any aspect of
assisted conception in the United States. Most jurisdictions in the
United States recognized artificial insemination by the woman's
spouse or by a donor as a legitimate method for assisting in the re101. The Victoria Infertility Act's coverage was clearly directed to in vitro
fertilization procedures (including embryo implantation) with scant comment
given to artificial insemination. Victoria Infertility Act.
102. See Diana Brahams, The Hasty British Ban on Commercial Surrogacy,
HASTINGS CENTER REP., Feb. 1987, at 16-18; see also News Notes, 13 FAM. L. REP.
(BNA) 1249, 1260 (Mar. 31, 1987) (discussing how the surrogacy issue is being
dealt with in Europe).
103. Brahams, supra note 102, at 17.
104. See also Latourette, supra note 19, at 81; Edward Yoxen, Conflicting
Concerns: The PoliticalContext of Recent Embryo Research Policy in Britain,
in THE NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 193 (Maureen McNeil et al. eds.,
1990); BLANK, supra note 1, at 143.
105. See irifra text accompanying notes 258-268 and 276-279 and 284 for a
discussion of international developments on noncoital reproductive technologies and surrogacies and OTA REPORT, supra note 8, at 176. Recent action by
France's Supreme Court has declared all surrogacy contracts illegal and unenforceable. News Summary - International,N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 1991, at 2. More
recently, the French government has proposed a series of laws on medical technology and procedures that would restrict artificial insemination and ban the
commercial promotion of surrogacy contracts. Sydney Rubin, SeparatingBody,
Technology, LANSING ST. J., Mar. 27, 1992, at 7A.
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productive process. 106 The main concerns evident in most statutory
enactments were the elimination of semen donor liability 10 7 (unless
the semen donor was the husband of the woman who was inseminated) and the declaration that the husband of the woman inseminated was the father of any child conceived by the process.1 08
Once IVF became a well-tested and proven procedure, centers
and programs sprang up throughout the United States to meet the
demand for this new procedure to aid conception. Eventually more
than 220 centers were soliciting patients for their IVF programs.10 9
Embryo transfer (ET) procedures were also being utilized but
on a more limited basis. 1 10 Part of the hesitation on the use of IVF
and ET procedures stemmed from the argument that state statutes
prohibiting embryo" transfers or embryo donations for non-therapeutic research or experimentation might apply to those procedures
used in an attempt to initiate gestation.'
Laws restricting fetal
research often do so in connection with an abortion.1 12 This restriction would technically include within its definition the flushing procedure used in an embryo transfer. 113 Other state laws prohibit the
selling or giving away of an embryo. These statutes may be subject
to challenge on constitutional grounds1 1 4 or, similar to the rationale
used in the SurrogateParentingand Baby Girl L.J. cases discussed
earlier, held to be inapplicable by viewing the different rationales of
the adoption statutes in prohibiting compensation and the in vitro
11 5
fertilization and embryo transfer procedures.
V.

LEGAL COMPLICATIONS OF SURROGACY ARRANGEMENTS

The use of surrogacy centers in the United States to join prospective couples with women willing to become surrogates
presented a new set of legal problems. Several centers faced suit
when costly arrangements turned sour. Various complainants alleged failure to provide adequate medical information on the surrogate, improper use of fertility drugs in attempts to induce
fertilization, and failure to secure the surrogate's signature on the
106. Eighteen states have adopted the Uniform Parentage Act, 9B U.L.A.
(Supp. 1993).
Other states have adopted similar language on artificial
insemination.
107. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5(a), 9B U.L.A. 295, 301 (Supp. 1993).
108. UNIF. PARENTAGE AT § 5, 9B U.L.A. 302 (Supp. 1993).
109. Judith Gains, A Scandal of Artifcial Insemination, N.Y. TIMES MAG.,
Oct. 7, 1990, at 23 (stating that 400 sperm banks were storing and/or selling

sperm).
110. Id. at 23.
111. Andrews, supra note 15, at 397.

112. Id.
113. Id.at 398.
114. Id. at 400.
115. See supra text accompanying notes 80-85.
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surrogacy contract prior to insemination.11 6 Complainants also alleged violations of the 13th and 14th Amendments. 1 7 Moreover,
concern was raised over the size of fees being charged by the surrogate brokers. 118
While not all surrogacy arrangements end up in litigation or
human tragedy," 9 the drama connected with conflict over surrogacy contracts has captured and remained in the public eye. Perhaps the most sensational and certainly one of the most tragic

surrogacy arrangements was entered into by Alexander Malahoff
and Judy and Ray Stiver in 1982. Following the surrogacy agreement under which Judy Stiver would be artificially inseminated
with Malahoff's semen, she became pregnant and gave birth to a
son in January 1983.120 The child was found to have microcephaly
2
cytomegalovirus, a pre-birth virus which causes brain damage.' '
Malahoff decided he did not want to take the child and later
claimed the child was not his. In a scenario befitting the sensationalism of today's tabloids, the results of blood tests on Malahoff and
Ray Stiver, Judy's husband, were announced on television's "Phil
Donahue Show."'1 22 The tests established that Ray Stiver, not Alexander Malahoff, was the genetic father of Baby Doe, later named
Christopher Ray Stiver. 123 Malahoff filed subsequent lawsuits
against the Stivers who in turn sued the doctor, lawyer, and psychiatrist involved in the surrogacy arrangement for not providing
proper counseling. 12 4 The Stivers also sued Malahoff for invasion
125
of privacy.
116. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recently ruled
that surrogate brokers, as well as doctors and lawyers, may be liable for negligence in a surrogacy contract setting if they fail to affirmatively act to protect
the child, surrogate mother, and the contracting father from harm caused by
the event. Stiver v. Parker, 975 F.2d 261 (6th Cir. 1992). See also OTA REPORT,
supra note 8, at 270.
117. Doe v. Keane, 658 F. Supp. 216 (W.D. Mich. 1987).
118. Six figure fees for surrogates have been used in advertisements. George
J. Annas, Making Babies Without Sex: The Law and the Profits, 74 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH 1415, 1416 (1984).

119. Only 1% of surrogacy arrangements have resulted in custody battles but
75% of mothers putting babies up for adoption change their minds. Lori B.
Andrews, Surrogate Motherhood: A Challengefor Feminists, 16 LAW, MED. &
HEALTH CARE 74, 76 (1988). But see Rebecca Powers & Sheila G. Belloli, The
Baby Business, THE DET. NEWS, Sept. 20, 1989, at 1E, 4E (reviewing the high
economic and emotional costs involed in surrogacy arrangements).
120. John Schneider, Stiver Family Takes it "Day by Day," LANSING ST. J.,
Jan. 6, 1985, at 1A.
121. Id.
122. Id.; see Andrews, supra note 33, at 56.
123. Andrews, supra,note 33, at 56. See Jean Moore, Stivers Sue Attorneys,
Doctors, LANSING ST. J., Apr. 29, 1983, at 1A.
124. Andrews, supra note 33, at 56. See John Schneider, Stivers File MultiMillion Damage Suit, LANSING ST. J., Jan. 12, 1985, at 1A.
125. Moore, supra note 123, at 6A.
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The spotlight on Michigan continued when, in 1986, national
and local news media reported the birth of a baby girl to Shannon
Boff, a surrogate mother. 12 6 The birth on April 13, 1986, was the
first time a surrogate mother had conceived and delivered a child
for a woman who had undergone a hysterectomy following a miscarriage some years earlier. The woman's egg was fertilized in an
27
in vitro fertilization procedure, then implanted in the surrogate.'
After blood and tissue tests confirmed the genetic parentage of
the woman and her husband, Wayne County Circuit Judge Marianne Battani issued a ruling that the New York couple were the
legal biological parents of the unborn infant. 128 The woman providing the egg and her husband providing the sperm would be named
as the parents on the child's birth certificate and, contrary to the
process raised in Doe v. Kelley and Syrkowski v. Appleyard, the par29
ents could avoid using the Michigan adoption process.'

VI. PRE-BABY M LEGISLATION AND MODEL ACTS
The Malahoff-Stiver incident increased the concern over surrogacy arrangements already being expressed by proposed legislation
in almost every state. However, by 1987 only four states had enacted laws dealing with surrogacy. An Arkansas statute enacted in
1985 stated that if a couple contracted with an unmarried surrogate,
the couple and not the surrogate would be considered the legal parents. 3 0° Inferentially, if the surrogate were married, the surrogate
and her husband would be considered the legal parents.
In 1986 Louisiana passed legislation declaring paid surrogacy
contracts to be unenforceable. 131 Nevada exempted surrogacy from
its laws on adoption which prohibited payment of a fee to the
32
mother.'
Prior to the celebrated Baby M decision, the concern over lack
of regulation for surrogacy arrangements and new reproductive
technology resulted in several model acts being proposed. The Proposed Uniform Surrogate Parenting Act 133 dealt exclusively with
126. Motherhood Minus Mom, TIME, Apr. 28, 1986, at 39; Robert Ankeny,
Surrogate'sBaby Makes History, DET. NEWS, Apr. 17, 1989, at 1A, 12A; Steven
Findlay, Redefines What "Mother"Really Means, USA TODAY, Apr. 17, 1986, at
IA, 2A.
127. Ankeny, supra note 126, at 12A.
128. M.B. Dillion, Surrogate Birth Made Medical and Legal History,
REDFORD OBSERVER, May 1, 1986, at 1.

129. Id.
130. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-201 (Michie 1987).
131. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9-2713 (West 1992).
132. NEV. REV. STAT. § 127.287 (1987).
133. John J. Mandler, Developing a Concept of the Modern "Family": A Proposed Uniform SurrogateParenthoodAct, 73 GEO. L.J. 1283 (1985) [hereinafter
Proposed Uniform Surrogacy Act].
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the surrogacy issue in outlining appropriate procedures and limitations for surrogate arrangements. 134 One of the provisions in the
Proposed Surrogate Act required the proper filing of documents for
a surrogacy parenthood arrangement (including the surrogacy contract) prior to insemination of the surrogate.13 5 The Act also required compliance with, and documentation of, counseling for both
the natural father and his wife as well as for the surrogate mother
and her husband.136 Blood and tissue tests were proscribed to es137
tablish paternity of the child.
The Model Human Reproductive Technologies and Surrogacy
Act 138 proposed in 1987 was a more ambitious undertaking, pursuing a number of issues related to in vitro fertilization, artificial insemination, and the collection and storage of human gametes and
pre-embryos. 139 Child support and intestate issues were also covered. 140 All artificial insemination and in vitro fertilization procedures were to be performed under the auspices of the State
Department of Health and would be preceded by extensive medical
and nonmedical evaluations and counseling. 14 1 Surrogacy arrangements were authorized but the Model Reproductive Act required
judicial approval prior to the surrogate being impregnated. 142 Regulations issued by the State Department of Health would govern
the attempts at impregnation. 143 Although the Proposed Surrogacy
Act was silent on the surrogate's right to terminate a surrogacy arrangement, the Model Reproductive Act gave the natural mother
seventy-two hours after the child's birth to renounce the surrogacy
44
agreement and keep the child.'
Neither the Proposed Surrogacy Act nor the Model Reproductive Act precluded financial arrangements whereby the surrogate
would receive compensation in addition to payment of reasonable
expenses. 145 Judicial approval of the agreement prior to impregna134. Id.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Id. at 1322.
Id. at 1323-24.
Id. at 1328.
Randall P. Bezanson et al., Model Human Reproductive Technologies

and SurrogacyAct, 72 IOWA L. REV. 943, 947 (1987) [hereinafter Model Repro-

ductive Act].
139. Id. at 967-68, 997-98.
140. Id. at 963-66.
141. Id. at 967-72, 991-92.
142. Id. at 976-79.
143. Model Reproductive Act, supra note 138, at 973-74.
144. Id. at 980-85.
145. Model Reproductive Act, supra note 138, at 980-81 (allowing for a compensation fee to be put into an escrow account until the contract is completed or
terminated); Proposed Uniform Surrogacy Act, supra note 133, at 1325-26 (al-

lowing compensation of the surrogate, but limiting such compensation to
$25,000).
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tion attempts would operate as a control mechanism over the
amount of the compensation to be paid the surrogate, assuring the
fee arrangement would meet the test of reasonableness.
VII.

THE BABY M DECISION

The center stage for surrogacy contracts in the United States
14
shifted from Michigan to New Jersey in 1987 with In re Baby M. 6
William Stem, the natural father of Baby M, and his wife brought
suit against Mary Beth Whitehead, the surrogate mother, to enforce
a surrogacy contract entered into with her and her husband, Richard. In 1979 Mrs. Stern had been diagnosed as having a mild case of
multiple sclerosis, a condition which could be exacerbated by pregnancy. The Sterns felt this risk to be too great and they turned to
other options for parenthood. Inquiries into in vitro fertilization
were met with discouraging news. 1 4 7 After reading an ad from The
Infertility Center of New York,148 the Sterns decided to attempt a
surrogacy arrangement.
The Sterns and the Whiteheads were brought together by The
Infertility Center as part of the Stems attempt to find a surrogate.
After the contract was signed, Mary Beth Whitehead was impregnated with William Stern's semen and became pregnant in July
1985. She later delivered a healthy baby girl on March 27, 1986.149
Mary Beth Whitehead turned the baby over to the Sterns but later
requested the baby be returned to her for a week. The Sterns complied with this request and allowed Mary Beth to keep Baby M (for
Melissa) for that time. 15° She then decided to keep the baby and
refused to return Baby M to the Sterns, who then sued to enforce
the contract. 15 1 The Whiteheads fled New Jersey with Baby M and
went to Florida. Several months later Baby M was found living
52
with relatives of the Whiteheads and was taken into custody.'
The baby was returned to New Jersey through court order. In the
subsequent litigation Judge Sokow rejected arguments attacking
the validity of the surrogacy contract1 5" and ruled for the Sterns in
146. 525 A.2d 1128 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1987), cff'd in part,rev'd in part,
537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).

147. Id,at 1141.
148. The Infertility Center at New York was founded by Noel Keane.

& BREo, supra note 58, at 27.
149. In re Baby M, 525 A.2d at 1144.
150. Id. at 1144.
151. Id. at 1145.
152. Id at 1146.
153. One of the arguments by the Whiteheads claimed that the concept of
surrogacy was contrary to New Jersey's adoption laws. Judge Sokow rejected
KEANE

this position: "It is this court's view that the laws of adoption in this state do not
apply to surrogacy contracts." Id at 1157. This was the identical position taken

in Surrogate Parenting Assoc., Inc. v. Commonwealth, 704 S.W.2d 209 (Ky.
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holding the contract to be enforceable consistent with the best interests of the child.154
On appeal, the Supreme Court of New Jersey unanimously reversed in a sharply worded decision, invalidating the contract and
finding the agreement to be in conflict with New Jersey law and
public policy.' 5 5 In reversing Judge Sokow's ruling, the New Jersey
Supreme Court did not technically rule on all surrogacy arrangements,' r but, rather, found the payment of money to a surrogate
mother to be "illegal, perhaps criminal, and potentially degrading to
57
women."1
The statutory challenge to the Whitehead-Stern surrogacy arrangement focused on the contract's conflict with New Jersey adoption laws prohibiting the use of money in connection with an
adoption.' 5 8 The court also found the contract to be in conflict with
New Jersey adoption laws requiring proof of parental unfitness or
abandonment prior to termination of parental rights or approval of
adoption. 159 Finally, the court further held the contract to be in
violation of other adoption laws allowing the surrender of custody
in a private placement adoption to be revocable. 160
The question has been raised whether laws enacted decades ago
to deal with the issue of adoption should now be used to resolve
issues on medical procedures and contractual arrangements un16
known and not possible when the adoption laws were passed. '
Certainly, the earlier Surrogate Parenting case in Kentucky and
the Baby Girl L.J. decision in New York rejected this analogy and
deemed the issue to be one for the legislature to resolve.' 62 The
1986), and In re Adoption of Baby Girl L.J., 505 N.Y.S.2d 813 (N.Y. Surrogate's
Ct. 1986), the only two judicial decisions in the U.S. with precedential value

which had directly ruled on surrogacy contracts previous to Baby M.
154. In re Baby M, 525 A.2d at 1170.
155. Id at 1227.
156. See id. at 1235 ("We find no offense to our present laws where a woman
voluntarily and without payment agrees to act as a 'surrogate' mother, provided
that she is not subject to a binding agreement to surrender her child."). See also
John Dunne & Gregory Serio, Surrogate ParentingAfter Baby M, The Ball
Moves to the Legislature's Court, 4 TOURO L. REV. 161, 163 (1988) (stating that
"[t]he court's holdings constitute the strongest critiques to date that any bodylegislative, judicial, or other-has made of the practice").
157. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1234.
158. Id,at 1240.
159. Id. at 1242-44.
160. Id. at 1244-45.
161. See Noel P. Keane, Legal Problems of Surrogate Motherhood, 1980 S.
ILL. U. L.J. 147, 152 (1980) ("Although the evident purpose of these [adoption]
statutes is to prevent the 'sale' of infants as if they were property, their language is sufficiently broad-or overbroad-to forbid compensation for a surrogate
mother.").
162. See supra notes 80-88 and accompanying text for a discussion on the
SurrogateParentingand Baby Girl L.J. cases.
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New Jersey Supreme Court, on the other hand, felt the analogy to
be persuasive in deciding the Baby M decision. 16s Consistent with
the state's parens patriae role in protecting the legally voiceless
child, Baby M, the court had no trouble in determining the surrogacy arrangement to be contrary to the state's public policy as found
in the New Jersey adoption laws.lM
VIII.

POST-BABY M LEGISLATION

For all the attention given to the Baby M sequel from its inception, 16 5 the decision ultimately did not generate the immediate rash
of litigation or statutory reaction as had been anticipated, although
it did stir the legislative waters in a number of states. Legislation
on surrogacy arrangements was already in the hopper in most states
prior to Baby M and, in some instances, the New Jersey decision
could be considered the impetus for passage of bills restricting or
avoiding surrogacy contracts. Arizona, 166 Indiana,16 7 Kentucky, 168
Nebraska, 16 9 and North Dakota170 adopted fairly simple legislation
163. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1240-41.
164. Id. at 1246. For a copy of the contract between the Sterns, Whiteheads,
and the Infertility Center included in the New Jersey Supreme Court decision,
see id. at 1265-72.
The trial court decision of Judge Sokow and the New Jersey Supreme
Court decision by Justice Wilentz have and will no doubt continue to receive
either praise or criticism from various legal commentators. See, e.g., Latourette,
supra note 19, at 54 (referring to the opinion of Justice Wilentz as "eloquent");
Posner, supra note 19, at 29 (stating the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision
in Baby M was "nothing short of an intellectual disaster"); Majorie M. Shultz,
Reproductive Technology and Intent-Based Parenthood An Opportunity for
Gender Neutrality, 1990 Wis. L. REV. 297, 299 (stating that "[t]he [New Jersey
Supreme Court] failed to appreciate in this setting what it has so richly illuminated regarding death: technological change requires new choices and responsibilities."); Gary N. Skoloff & Edward J. O'Donnell, Baby M: A Disquieting
Decision, 18 SETON HALL L. REV. 827, 829 (1988) (stating that "[t]he refusal to
enforce a surrogate contract is unduly paternalistic and certainly sexist in its
refusal to acknowledge the decisional autonomy of the female participant to the
surrogate arrangement, namely the surrogate mother."). See also Annas, supra
note 20, at 21-24 (referring to Justice Wilentz's opinion); George J. Annas, Baby
M.: Babies (and Justice)for Sale, HASTINGS CENTER REP., June 1987, at 13-15.
165. By early 1988, 100 bills relating to surrogacy had been introduced in
state and federal legislatures. HUM. RTs. L. REP. 199 (May-June 1988). For a
discussion of these proposed state laws, see Lori B. Andrews, The Aftermath of
Baby M. Proposed State Laws on Surrogate Motherhood, HASTINGS CENTER
REP. Oct.-Nov. 1987, at 31-41. Federal legislation was introduced in 1989 by Rep.
Thomas Luken (D-Ohio) and Rep. Robert Dornam (R-Cal.) that would have
nullified surrogate arrangements and criminalized the acts of surrogate
mothers. See H.R. 275, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); H.R. 576, 101st Cong., 1st
Sess. (1989).
166. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-218 (1991).
167. IND. CODE ANN. § 31-8-2-1 (West Supp. 1992).
168. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17-199.590 (Baldwin 1993).
169. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 25-21,200 (1989).
170. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-18-05 (1991).
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voiding most surrogacy contracts or declaring such contracts to be
171
unenforceable and contrary to public policy. New Hampshire,
Utah 1 72 and Washington 173 and, most recently, New York 174 attached misdemeanor criminal sanctions as well. These sanctions
applied to parties or legal entities involved in surrogacy contracts
for compensation or profit.175 Perhaps the most restrictive legislation was passed in Michigan 176 and New York,177 which approved
bills that attached misdemeanor and felony criminal sanctions to
178
parties involved in surrogacy contracts for compensation.
Not all legislation negated surrogacy arrangements. A West
Virginia statute allowed the payment or receipt of fees and expenses in surrogate mother agreements. 179 Florida enacted legislation to regulate "pre-planned adoption agreements."' 8 0
Key
elements of the Florida legislation required prior judicial approval
of the arrangement and gave the volunteer surrogate mother the
right to rescind the contract within seven days after birth.' 81 Payment for reasonable living expenses was allowed but no other compensation would be permitted. No payment could be considered as
compensation for the termination of parental rights. 82 The Florida
Act further prohibited the payment of fees to find volunteer
mothers or for matching volunteers with intended parents. 8 3 The
State of Kentucky enacted legislation permitting surrogacy contracts but compensation for termination of parental rights is prohibited.I 84 Go-betweens cannot be compensated for their services and
any contract for such compensation is declared void. l85 Iowa exempted surrogate mother arrangements from a prior statute declar86
ing the purchase or sale of an individual to be a felony.'
Shortly after the New Jersey Supreme Court issued its decision
in the Baby M case, the Family Law Section of the American Bar
171. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B (Supp. 1992).
172. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-204 (Supp. 1992).
173. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.240 (West Supp. 1992).
174. Surrogate Parenting Contracts Act, N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §§ 121-124
(McKinney 1993).
175. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B; UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-204(1); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.250. See also VA. CODE ANN. § 20-165A (Michie 1992).
176. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.853 (West Supp. 1991).
177. Surrogate Parenting Contracts Act, N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §§ 121-124
(McKinney 1993).
178. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.859 (West Supp. 1991).
179. W. VA. CODE § 46-4-16 (Supp. 1990).
180. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 6-63.212 (West Supp. 1993).
181. Id. § 63.212(1)(i)(2a).
182. Id. § 63.212(1)(i).
183. Id. § 63.212(1)(i)(5).
184. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17-199.590 (Baldwin 1993).
185. Id.
186. IOWA CODE ANN. § 710.11 (West Supp. 1993).
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Association recommended a Model Act to regulate surrogacy contracts. 18 7 The ABA Model Surrogacy Act attempted "to meet the
challenge posed by the New Jersey Supreme Court in In Re Baby
M-the enactment of legislation facilitating the use of new reproductive technologies by infertile couples, and minimalization of any
risk of abuse to the participants of the arrangement, subject, of
course, to constitutional constraints."18 8 The ABA Model Surrogacy Act would have required extensive medical and legal counseling.'8 9 Licensed surrogacy agencies would provide counseling and
insure that required examinations were conducted. i 9° The natural
mother was not given any period of grace within which to renounce
the contract and keep the child. Compensation to the surrogate was
permitted but not to exceed $12,500. iL9 Thus, even in the aftermath
of the New Jersey Supreme Court's broad-based attack on paid surrogacy arrangements by declaring such contracts to be void, the
ABA Model Surrogacy Act included a provision allowing substantial compensation as part of its recommendations for regulating,
92
rather than condemning, surrogacy arrangements.
The ABA Model Surrogacy Act was presented to the ABA
House of Delegates at its annual meeting in 1989 and was rejected.' 9 3 In its stead, the House approved an alternative act-The
Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act (Uniform
Status Act), i 94 which had been promulgated by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) the
preceding August. 95 The Prefatory Note to the Uniform Act states
that the "Act is not a surrogacy regulating act nor was it intended to
be." Nevertheless, the Act did make use of "such limited and monitored surrogacy procedures as might be necessary to accomplish its
mandate," which was to draft a child oriented act "to benefit children born as a result of this modern new miracle."'' 9 The Act also
187. The Model Surrogacy Act received the approval of the Council of the

American Bar Association's Section of Family Law in January 1988. See Draft
ABA Model Surrogacy Act, 22 FAM. L. Q. 123, 123-43 (1988).

188.
189.
190.
191.

Id.
Id.at 127-30 (§ 4).
Id.at 140-41 (Q16).
Id. at 126 (Q3(b)).

192. See Draft ABA Model Surrogacy Act, supra note 187, at 126 (Q 3(a))
(stating that "[a]n agreement for surrogacy in compliance with section 5 below

shall be valid as a matter of public policy").
193. Stephanie Goldberg, Surrogacy Act Passed, 75 A.B.A. J. 128 (1989).

194. UNIF. STATUS OF CHILDREN OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION ACT §§ 1-16, 9B
U.L.A. 136-50 (Supp. 1993) [hereinafter UNIF. STATUS ACT].
195. Goldberg, supra note 193, at 128.
196. UNIF. STATUS ACT (Prefatory Note), 9B U.L.A. 136. For a criticism of

the Uniform Status Act for failure to take a more positive and comprehensive
position on surrogacy, see Mimi Yoon, Note, The Uniform Status of Children of
Assisted Conception Act" Does It Protect the Best Interests of the Child in a
SurrogateArrangement? 16 AM. J.L. & MED. 525, 552 (1990).
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encompassed artificial insemination and in vitro fertilization procedures except those involving husband and wife only.197
Alternative optional provisions on surrogacy arrangements
were included within the Uniform Status Act, thus avoiding the
political debate still going on in many states. Alternative A recognized the right of parties to enter into surrogacy contracts, subject
to advance judicial approval. 198 Court approval was necessary prior
to the initiation of artificial insemination or in vitro fertilization
procedures, whichever process the parties had selected. 199 One of
the required findings by the court before approving a surrogacy arrangement was that "the intended mother is unable to bear a child
or is unable to do so at least without unreasonable risk to the child
or the physical or mental health of the intended mother or
child. '' 2° ° While the earlier Model Surrogacy Act rejected by the
House of Delegates had not allowed the natural mother to disavow
the contract and retain the child, the Uniform Status Act permitted
a surrogate whose egg had been fertilized (the biological mother) to
file a written notice for termination of the agreement within 180
201
days after the last insemination.
If the ovum had been provided by a third party, either the natural father's spouse or a donor, such as through an IVF, GIFT or
ZIFT procedure, 20 2 the surrogate's right of termination would not
apply. Also, any surrogacy agreement could be terminated prior to
20 3
the surrogate's pregnancy.
The 180 day "rescission" provision in the Uniform Status Act
was essentially a compromise to avoid a conflict posed by earlier
197. UNIF. STATUS AcT § 1(1), 9B U.L.A. 138. Under section 1(1), an "assisted conception" means "a pregnancy resulting from (i) fertilizing an egg of a
woman with sperm of a man by means of other than sexual intercourse or (ii)
implanting an embryo, but the term does not include pregnancy of a wife resulting from fertilizing her egg with sperm of her husband." Id
198. Id. § 5(Alt. B), 9B U.L.A. 141. "If the agreement is not approved by the
court under Section 6 before conception the agreement is void and the surrogate
is the mother of the resulting child and the surrogate's husband, if a party to the
agreement, is the father of the child." Id (emphasis added).
199. Extensive judicial intervention was also articulated in the rejected
Model Surrogacy Act. Contrary to the Uniform Status Act's requirement of
judicial pre-authorization of assisted conception, however, the Model Surrogacy

Act would have provided for a judicial hearing on a certificate of parentage petition within one year after the child was born. See Droft ABA Model Surrogacy
Act, supra note 187, at 135-39 (§3 8, 9).
200. UNIF. STATUS ACT § 6(b)(2), 9B U.L.A. 142.

201. Id,§ 7(b), 9B U.L.A. 145.
202. See supra notes 13-18 for a discussion of these medical procedures.
203. UNIF. STATUS AcT § 7(a), 9B U.L.A. 145. See the comment to section 7
for a discussion of the rationale behind having a period for recanting the surrogacy arrangement and the selection of 180 days as the time period within which
the genetic surrogate could terminate the agreement. Id.§ 7 commentary, 9B
U.L.A. 145.
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recommendations. One position argued that a contract of this nature, having required extensive counseling, informed consent, and
court approval prior to insemination, should not need a right of rescission. 2° 4 The contrary view would emulate the adoption model
in allowing the mother a limited time after birth of her child in
which to change her mind and keep her child.2° 5 Also, Alternative
A would allow payment to the surrogate beyond actual expenses
2°6
involved in the pregnancy and birth.
Alternative B of the Uniform Status Act declared all surrogacy
contracts to be void and unenforceable without regard to whether
the arrangement was for a fee or merely altruistic.207 However, no
criminal sanctions were imposed on any of the parties involved in
the unenforceable contract. In fact, a provision was made in Alternative B to identify the parentage of any child born in a surrogacy
arrangement, declaring the surrogate to be the mother of the
child 2 8 and her husband, if a party to the void agreement, to be the
father of the child. 2° 9
North Dakota is the only state to date responding favorably to
the Uniform Status Act. North Dakota adopted Alternative B
which declares that any "agreement in which a woman agrees to
become a surrogate or to relinquish her rights and duties as parent
of a child thereafter conceived through assisted conception is
void. '210 The surrogate's husband is declared the father of the child
if he was a party to the void agreement. Otherwise, paternity is
211
governed by the provisions of the Uniform Parentage Act.
Virginia recently approved legislation which, similar to Alternative A of the Uniform Status Act, would allow, but highly regulate, surrogacy contracts. 212 Contrary to Alternative A, however,
the Virginia legislation prohibits the payment of fees other than expenses to the surrogate. Any provision calling for non-expenses
213
compensation would be void.
204. The rejected Model Surrogacy Act did not allow termination by the surrogate following conception. See Draft ABA Model Surrogacy Act, supra note
187, at 134 (§ 6(f)). Under section 6(f), the surrogate has an option to retain the
child if both the intended parents died before taking physical custody of the
child. Id. Specific performance after the child was born was given as a remedy
under the Model Surrogacy Act. Id. at 133 (§ 6(c)).
205. UNIF. STATUS AcT § 7 commentary, 9B U.L.A. 145-46.
206. Id § 9(a), 9B U.L.A. 146.
207. Id. § 5(Alt. B), 9B U.L.A. 141.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-18-05 (1991).
211. UNIF. PARENTAGE AT §§ 1-16, 9B U.L.A. 136-50 (Supp. 1993).
212. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-156 to -165 (Michie 1992).
213. Id. § 20-16(A). Compare id.§ 20-16(A)(disallowing compensation for
non-expenses) with UNIF. STATUS ACT § 9(a), 9B U.L.A. 99 (allowing a court
approved agreement to provide for compensation beyond expenses).
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The approval of the Uniform Status Act by the American Bar
Association and its subsequent adoption in North Dakota poses a
significant problem. The Uniform Status Act does not respond to
the numerous problems and consequences of assisted reproduction
and surrogacy. Indeed, the Prefatory Note to the Uniform Status
Act states that the Act "is not a surrogacy regulatory act nor was it
intended to be."'214 However, state legislatures seeking a quick response to the surrogacy dilemma may well treat the Uniform Status
Act as "the answer" and never go on to resolve the many related
issues.
In addition to the recent legislation in North Dakota voiding
surrogate contracts, two other states, New Hampshire and Virginia,
have approved legislation expanding the statutory regulation of assisted conception and surrogacy. In adopting House Bill 1426 in
April of 1990,215 New Hampshire clearly recognized the interrelationship of procedures facilitating reproduction and arrangements
for surrogacy by including within the Act provisions on artificial
insemination, in vitro fertilization, 216 pre-embryo transfer, 217 and
surrogacy arrangements. 2 18 Moreover, rules for determining parentage are prescribed where reproductive and surrogacy arrangements are utilized. 219 Regulations on support obligations and for
220
succession are included to cover other problematic areas.
The statutory provisions on artificial insemination and in vitro
fertilization under the New Hampshire statute require medical
evaluation and demonstration of "medical acceptability" of any potential sperm donor.2 21 The sperm donor is liable for support of the
child only if an agreement to that effect has been made in writing. 222 Pre-embryo transfer and in vitro fertilization procedures
are subject to public health service rules. Counseling of both the
woman who will receive in vitro fertilization and her husband is
22 3
required.
Surrogacy arrangements are extensively regulated and are
legal only if in accord with the New Hampshire statute. The arrangement must be judicially authorized prior to the inception of
214. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-18-05 (1991).
215. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 161-A to 168-B:32 (Supp. 1992).
216. Id. §§ 168-B:1, 13, 14, 15.

217. Id.
218. Id. §§ 168-B:16-28.
219. Id. §§ 168-B:2-9.
220. See N.H. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:8 for support provisions. See id. § 168-B:9
for provisions on intestate and testate succession.

221. Id. § 168-B:10.
222. Id. § 168-B:11.
223. Id. § 168-B:18.
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attempts to impregnate the surrogate.22 4 Medical and nonmedical
evaluations and counseling of the parties are also required.22 5 Solicitation or the inducement of prospective surrogates or intended parents for compensation is prohibited and carries a misdemeanor
226
penalty under the statute.
Although donation of either male or female gametes is allowed
in the reproductive procedures, donation of both sperm and ovum
in a surrogacy arrangement is not permitted under the New Hampshire statute. One of the intended parents must provide a gamete to
227
be used in impregnating the surrogate.
After a petition has been filed by the parties for a pre-authorization hearing, the surrogacy arrangement will be reviewed by the
court, and if the contract and other documents are found to be in
compliance with the statute, an order validating the arrangement
will be issued.228 One of the required findings for such validation is
that the surrogacy contract is in the best interest of the child.2 9
Fees to be paid to the surrogate are limited to pregnancy and
birth related medical expenses. Actual lost wages are included only
if the attending physician has recommended the surrogate abstain
from employment during the pregnancy. 23 0 Also, the cost of insurance during the term of the pregnancy, legal fees, and the evaluations and counseling expenses are authorized payments under the
231
statute.
Judicial authorization of the surrogacy arrangement followed
by subsequent pregnancy and birth do not guarantee that the intended parents will receive custody of the child. A key requirement
of the surrogacy contract is a provision allowing the surrogate to
keep the child if she gives proper notice of her intention to do so
2
prior to seventy-two hours after the child is born.

32

The New Hampshire statute specifies the damages available for
breach of the surrogacy contract, which are basically limited to re233
covery of fees or expenses already incurred under the contract.
The major exception would involve an action to enforce a child support provision of the contract.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.

Id.§§ 168-B:20-24.
N.H. STAT. ANN. §§ 168-B:18-19 (Supp. 1992).
Id.§§ 168-B:16(IV), 30.
Id. § 168-B:17(III).
Id.§ 168-B:23(III).
I& § 168-B:23(III)(d).
N.H. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:25(V) (Supp. 1992).
Id. § 168-B:25(V).
Id. § 168-B:25(IV).
Id. § 168-B:28(II)(a)(b).
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A broad scope of immunity is given under the statute. Any
person acting non-negligently is shielded from criminal or civil liability. 234 In addition, health care providers are similarly protected
for actions taken under the statutory framework provided their action is "in accord with reasonable medical standards. ''235
At the time of its enactment in 1990, the New Hampshire bill
was the most extensive state legislation taking a comprehensive approach to assisted conception and surrogacy. It is reasonable to assume that the prohibition of any compensation beyond expenses,
the criminalization of attempts to solicit parties for a compensated
surrogacy arrangement, and the right of the surrogate to change
her mind and keep the child will combine to reduce in dramatic
fashion the situations under which surrogacy might be considered.
Viewed in its entirety without passing judgment on the restrictive
surrogacy component, the statute should be considered in a positive
light. The legislature has clearly recognized and given credence to
both the relationship between conception medical procedures and
conception-fueled contract arrangements, and the need to regulate
the entire process. Of particular importance to parties involved in
assisted conception procedures are those provisions calling for extensive evaluation and counseling of all parties.2 36 Complications
and disappointments may still occur, but the statute has plugged
several of the most obvious gaps in the patchwork quilt of assisted
conception and surrogacy statutes.
The most recent comprehensive state action took place in 1991
when Virginia approved legislation on the status of children of assisted conception. 2 37 The statutory recognition of medical sophistication and technology in assisted conception is immediately noted
in the legislation by reference to the listing of procedures and parties involved in the technology. 238 The term "assisted conception"
identifies "a pregnancy resulting from the insemination of her
ovum using her husband's sperm, whether in vivo or in vitro,
which completely or partially replaces sexual intercourse as the
means of conception. '239 This encompassing language takes into
account not merely current technology but also responds prospectively to other medical technology not yet in use.
234. Id.§ 168-B:29(I).
235. N.H. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:29(II) (Supp. 1992).
236. Id. §§ 168-B:13, 18, 19.
237. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-156 to -165 (Michie 1992). The New York legislation is chronologically the most recent but its provisions are more consistent
with those statutes dealing only with surrogacy. See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW

§§ 121-24 (McKinney 1993).
238. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-156 (Michie 1992).
239. Id.
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The Virginia statute establishes rules of parentage for any child
resulting from assisted conception, including situations on death of
a spouse, divorce and surrogacy contracts. 240 In similar fashion to
the New Hampshire bill, the Virginia Act requires a genetic relationship between one of the intended parents and the child to be
gestated by a surrogate. 241 If neither intended parent is genetically
related, then the surrogate and her husband (if a party to the surrogate contract) are declared to be the mother and father of the
child. 2 42

The intended parents could then obtain parental rights

only through state adoption procedures.
A unique feature of the Virginia legislation recognizes and
makes allowance for two different approaches to surrogacy arrangements. The first approach, similar to that found in other
states or in model legislation, accepts the court-approved arrangement prior to the beginning of attempts at conception. All parties
to the contract are required to undergo physical examinations, psychological evaluations, and counseling. 243 The court would review
the surrogacy contract and other documentation for compliance
with the statute.244 Among the required findings by the court is
that the agreement "would not be substantially detrimental to the
interests of any of the affected persons. ' 245 This approach is considerably broader than that found in the New Hampshire legislation
246
which refers only to the best interest of the child.

Similar to a provision of the Uniform Act on the Status of Children of Assisted Conception, the surrogate is allowed the right to
terminate the surrogacy arrangement "within 180 days after the
'247
last performance of any assisted conception.
If prior court approval was not sought by the parties, the surrogacy contract may still be enforceable if the surrogate relinquished
her parental rights to the intended parents at least 25 days after the
child is born.248 Any provision in the contract calling for compensation of the surrogate is void and unenforceable but the contract
249
would seemingly remain enforceable.
Criminal penalties are included for parties arranging or inducing others to enter into a surrogacy contract for compensation. 250 A
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.

Id. § 20-158.
Id
Id. § 20-158(E)(2).

§§ 20-159 to -160 (Michie 1992).
Id.
Id. § 20-160.
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:23 (Supp. 1992).
VA. CODE ANN. § 20-161(B) (Michie 1992).
Id. § 20-162(A)(3).
Id, § 20-162(A).
Id. § 20-165.
VA. CODE ANN.
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unique feature allows for a penalty of three times the fee received
against any broker facilitating the surrogacy contract. 25 1 Further,
the Virginia enactment also included extensive provisions for the
issuance of birth certificates in a variety of circumstances, including
252
those specifically involving assisted conception and surrogacy.
While the Virginia legislation artfully reflects the advances of
medical technology on assisted conception and offers a before or after choice for non-compensated surrogacy, the bill is essentially a
more sophisticated version of Alternative A in the Uniform Status
Act. 2 5 3 As such, it may also be viewed as a panacea for the entire
range of legal issues relating to facilitating reproduction and
surrogacy.
What conclusions are to be drawn from the current state of affairs on surrogacy agreements? The absence of legislation on surrogacy arrangements in most jurisdictions, coupled with the lack of
uniformity of treatment in those states which have enacted bills on
surrogacy, could lead to several different conclusions. The absence
of legislation in a given jurisdiction may be used to argue for a conclusion that the state should not be involved in surrogacy arrangements at all and that the matter is simply one of private contracts.
However, it is highly doubtful any court faced with a surrogacy case
in a jurisdiction lacking statutory coverage would accept such an
inference of intent in this simplistic approach. Certainly the Baby
M court did not respond in that fashion. 254 Even with such an argument, a pervasive counter-argument can be asserted for having the
state regulate surrogacy arrangements only to the extent necessary
to insure the best interests and protection of any child born as a
255
result of the surrogacy arrangement.
Perhaps this was the view forming the basis for the Uniform
Status Act. However, intervention to protect the child without serious impact on other parties to the transaction is extremely difficult
if not impossible. 256 Moreover, the brief but highly publicized his251. Id.
252. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-160, 20-162, 32.1-261 (Michie 1992).
253. UNIF. STATUS AcT §§ 1-16, 9B U.L.A. 136-50 (Supp. 1993).
254. The New Jersey Supreme Court recognized the role of the legislature in
promulgating laws on surrogacy but did not hesitate in declaring the Baby M
transaction void and contrary to the state's public policy. See supra text accompanying notes 155-157 for a discussion of the court's response.
255. See Yoon, supra note 196, for a discussion of the state regulation of surrogacy arrangements.
256. The physical, emotional, psychological, and economic involvement of
the parties to a surrogacy arrangement exist long before the child's birth and
continue long after the matter is resolved, whomever receives custody of the
child. The Virginia statute's reference to a surrogacy agreement that "would
not be substantially detrimental to the interests of any of the affected persons"
is demonstrable recognition of the potential for both great joy and devastating
pain in a surrogacy arrangement. VA. CODE ANN. § 620-160 (Michie 1992).
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tory of surrogacy contracts presents ample evidence of the need for
at least minimum regulation; the sole remaining issues should deal
with the form and degree of that regulation.
Unfortunately, the few judicial decisions on surrogacy present
heart-wrenching individual situations pushed into the public limelight where the court must attempt in Solomon-like fashion to resolve a problem where there is no completely "just" solution for all
parties. The statement "[h]ard cases make bad law" 257 could hardly
be more appropriate than in these cases.

IX. ANALYSIS OF SURROGACY DECISIONS AND LEGISLATION
An analysis of the limited number of decisions on surrogacy
combined with the enacted and proposed legislation in the United
States, England, and Australia produces a number of similar characteristics. First, although several legislative enactments declare
all surrogacy arrangements to be void,2 58 the theme of the Baby M
decision and most legislation in the United States strikes at the
commercial and financial aspects of the arrangement. 259 This same
concern is found in Australia 26° and Great Britain statutes. 26 1 Accepting the premise for the moment that only commercial arrangements are to be voided or made criminal, then altruistic surrogacy
arrangements are not to be condemned, but are they to be ignored? 262 Any surrogacy arrangement has as its basic purpose the
bringing of human life into existence, a life which otherwise would
not be created. The impact upon all consenting parties is obviously
critical and, if the arrangement falls apart for one or more of a variety of reasons, the state may be forced to become a reluctant participant in the aftermath. Guidelines must to be enacted to provide
basic areas of needed protection for all of the individuals involved in
the non-commercial surrogacy. Parties to such an altruistic arrangement do not lose the need for counseling and medical testing
merely because the surrogate is not being compensated for her
257. Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1903) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
258. See supra text accompanying notes 166-170 for a discussion of states declaring surrogacy arrangements to be void.
259. The Baby M decision by the New Jersey Supreme Court clearly accepted non-compensated surrogacy arrangements. In re Baby M, 525 A.2d 1228,
1235 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1987), off'd in part, rev'd in part, 537 A.2d 1227
(N.J. 1988).
260. See supra notes 92-98 and 103 and accompanying text for a discussion of
some of the Australian and Great Britain statutes.
261. The Surrogacy Arrangement Act of 1985 referred to commercial surrogacy in criminalizing such activities. Brahms, supra note 102, at 17.
262. Considering the number of proposed bills on surrogacy, such a question
seems rhetorical. See supra note 165 for the number of bills introduced by 1988.
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role. 263
The second and perhaps even more critical similarity in surrogacy legislation is found in the lack of any reference to issues concerning the child born in a surrogacy arrangement. 264 Legislation
or judicial decisions declaring the surrogacy contract to be void or
crininalizing the transaction will no doubt deter most potential surrogacy participants, but others may still pursue such activities,
whether for compensation or not. Provision must be made to
clearly identify issues of paternity and support for any child born as
a result of a surrogacy arrangement. The Uniform Status Act does
deal with issues affecting the child but does so without connecting
265
into the other aspects of assisted conception.
The third similarity, and unfortunately so, is that the majority
of recent legislation refers only to surrogate mother contracts and
does not speak to the many facets of artificial insemination, in vitro
fertilization or embryo transfer.2 66 Admittedly, procedures for assisting reproduction deal with medical technology rather than the
more legalistic issues in surrogacy. This differentiation is sufficiently important so that issues relating to assisted conception could
263. One may argue that the altruistic nature of the arrangement necessitates an overly protective attitude toward the prospective surrogate because
non-commercial surrogacy arrangements typically involve a close relative of the
woman incapable of bearing a child. Removal of the compensation factor does
not remove all risks, even if appropriate testing and counseling are present.
The psychological problems in severing the child from the birthing mother are
still present. See Carvey, supra note 6, at 1212; John A. Wilson, SurrogateMotherhood - A Form of Maternal Prostitution- Merits Blanket Condemnation,
N.Y. ST. B.J., Dec. 1988, at 32.; Woman Gives Birth to Grandchildren,DET.
NEWS, Oct. 13, 1991, at 7A (discussing non-commercial arrangements). The
birth certificate will list the surrogate's daughter and son-in-law, the genetic
parents, as the legal parents. Woman Gives Birth to Grandchildren,supra, at
7A. A similar scenario was played out in South Africa where the grandmother
acted as a surrogate for her daughter. News Summary-International,N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 9, 1989, at Al.
The reverse role had a daughter carrying her mother's egg (fertilized by
her stepfather's sperm) and giving birth to her genetic half-sister. See Woman
Bear's Mother's Child, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Oct. 30, 1988, at 16A (discussing a
mother in Italy acting as a surrogate mother for her own mother's child); Lori
B. Andrews, When Baby's Mother is Also Grandma,and Sister-Commentary,
HASTINGS CENTER REP., Oct. 1985, at 29-30, reprintedin CASES IN BIOETHICS-SELECTIONS FROM THE HASTINGS CENTER REPORT 57-59 (Carol Levine ed., 1989).
264. The more recent legislation in Virginia and New Hampshire does not
share this inadequacy with earlier statutes. See N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 168B:2 to 168-B:9 (Supp. 1992); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-160 to 20-162 (Michie Supp.
1992); see also UNIF. STATUS ACT §§ 1-16, 9B U.L.A. 136-50 (Supp. 1993) (responding to the criticism of earlier statutes).
265. See supra notes 194-196 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Uniform Status Act defining a limited mandate of protecting children born as a
result of assisted conception.
266. Statutes on assisted conception have been enacted separately in several
of the states, with only a few, such as New Hampshire and Virginia, using a
more comprehensive approach. See supra text accompanying notes 45-46, 216220 and 238-245.
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be handled in other legislative coverage. 267 Support for this argument might be more forthcoming if legislation on the medical advancements involved in assisting conception was being promoted at
the same time as the legislation on surrogacy contracts. Even so,
the more logical approach would have legislation on the medical aspects of assisted conception include the continuum of surrogacy
arrangements.
Statutory enactments on surrogacy arrangements should not be
adopted in a vacuum; such legislation needs to be part of a thorough
statutory scheme regulating both the medical technologies and the
contractual aftermaths. The shortcoming of most surrogacy legislation has resulted from a myopic understanding and/or treatment of
the medical procedures involved in enabling surrogacy arrangements to become available to the public. Medical technology provided the impetus; it was only through the success of artificial
insemination, in vitro fertilization and embryo transfer procedures
that surrogacy arrangements became a viable alternative for
couples or individuals otherwise not capable of genetic
2 s
parenthood. 6
The problems inherently raised by surrogacy arrangements
have become even more complicated with the use of embryo implantation in which the surrogate mother does not provide the
ovum for the embryo but instead is implanted with a viable embryo. 269 The social parents provide the gametes for the embryo.
The surrogate is then not genetically related to the child she carries
and gives birth to. This embryo implantation procedure is more
expensive than in vitro fertilization or artificial insemination but
the odds of success are much greater. 270 There have been approximately eighty births through embryo implantation during the period from 1987 to 1990, as compared with nearly 2000 surrogate
births utilizing in vitro fertilization or artificial insemination dur27 1
ing the same period.
The distinction between gestational surrogacy and genetic surrogacy was critical in a California decision. On October 22, 1990,
Judge Richard N. Parslow, Jr., of the California Orange County Su267. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text for a discussion of other

legislative coverage that addresses issues related to assisted conception.
268. The first IVF baby, Louise Joy Brown, was born in 1978. BROWN &
BROWN, supra note 38, at 136; Lorio, supra note 13, at 973. The first IVF birth in
the United States took place in 1981. Lorio, supra note 13, at 978. The first
compensated surrogate mother was Elizabeth Kane in 1980. KEANE & BREO,
supra note 58, at 53; KANE, supra note 62, at 1.
269. See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text for a discussion of different methods of assisting conception.

270. Elmer-Dewitt, supra note 14, at 77 (reporting that the success rates using GIFT and ZIFT are as high as 50%).
271. Lawson, supra note 27, at Al.
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perior Court, ruled that a surrogate mother who carried an embryo
transfer for another couple, had no parental rights and was no more
than a foster parent "providing care, protection, and nurture during
the period of time that the natural mother ...was unable to care
for the child. '272 In affirming the lower court decision in favor of
the genetic parents, the California Supreme Court rejected arguments that the surrogacy arrangement violated public policy and
the state and federal constitutions, and instead based its ruling
on the intention of the parties as reflected in the surrogacy
273
agreement.
This latest round in the battle on surrogacy arrangements
again finds the law lacking in a clear-cut solution. Would the court
rule as it did in Calvert v. Johnson if the surrogate had provided the
egg, thus becoming both the genetic and birth mother? Even for
most of those states which had supposedly resolved the issue of surrogacy by statute or case law, the Johnson v. Calvert decision poses
a new dilemma. Baby M and adoption statutes declare compensation for the surrender of parental rights to be against public policy
and void, either in an adoption agreement or a surrogacy arrangement.2 74 It can be argued, then, that if the compensation in a surrogacy contract is for gestational services and not the surrender of
parental rights, the public policy argument raised by analogy from
the adoption statutes and its effect upon the surrogacy arrangement
is nullified. Most statutes that are now in effect to prohibit surrogacy arrangements did not anticipate the situation in which the surrogate is not genetically related to the child she carries and give
27 5
birth to.
272. Johnson v. Calvert, No. 63-31-90 (Orange Cty. Super. Ct. Calif. 1990); see
Rothenberg, supra, note 32, at 345; Susan Tifft, It's All in the (Parental)Genes,

TIME, Nov. 5, 1990, at 77 (reporting and discussing the California court's
decision).

273. Calvert v. Johnson, 19 Cal. Rptr. 494 (Cal. 1993). The court found no
solution under the Uniform Parentage Act, adopted in 1975 (CAL. CIV. CODE
§§ 7000-7018 (West 1983)) since both the surrogate (Anna Johnson) and the provider of the egg (Crispina Calvert) had provided evidence of maternity; Anna by

giving birth to the child and Crispina by being genetically related to the child.
With this dilemma, the court felt it necessary to inquire into the intentions of
the parties as reflected in the surrogacy agreement, concluding that "when two
means [of establishing a mother-child relationship] do not coincide in one woman, she who intended to procreate the child - that is, she who intended to
bring about the birth of a child that she intended to raise as her own is the
natural mother under California law." Id. at 500 (emphasis added).
274. In re Baby M, 525 A.2d 1128, 1157-59 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1987),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 537 A.2d 1237 (N.J. 1988); see N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW
§ 374 (McKinney 1992) (spelling out that "no person may or shall request, accept or receive any compensation or thing of value, directly or indirectly, in

connection with the placing out or adoption of a child"). Approximately half of
the states have similar legislation. Katz, supra note 9, at 8 n.34.
275. See In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1237 (N.J. 1988) (discussing the New Jersey
scheme and holding that the legislation could alter its current scheme of laws).
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The latest development in Great Britain has been the passage
of the Human Fertilization and Embryology Act of 1990.276 This
Act stringently regulates the acquisition, storage or use of gametes
and embryos, detailing strict licensing and record-keeping provisions for those agencies authorized to engage in approved activities.2 77 The Act further states parentage rules where assisted
conception procedures are utilized. 278 Surrogacy arrangements are
also covered to the extent that a couple involved in a non-compensatory surrogacy arrangement may later petition the court to be
declared the parents of a child born through a surrogacy
279
arrangement.
The current legislative attempts to regulate surrogacy arrangements are inherently flawed. A raft of problems remain to be
solved. Are all surrogacy arrangements to be condemned or only
those in which a fee is paid? Is money the issue or is it society's
concept of how a family should be formed? 28 0 Should in vitro
fertilization, for either single or married women, be allowed without genetic testing of the gametes and psychological evaluation of
the surrogate? Should not all parties to the arrangement receive
appropriate counseling and legal advice? These are just a few of the
issues currently unanswered by the paucity of legislative and judicial pronouncements on assisted reproduction and surrogacy
arrangements.
The medical procedures to aid human conception continue to
become more and more sophisticated. States failing to respond to
the medical advancements or which pass laws dealing with only one
or more segments of the issue can expect the dike to leak elsewhere
and in a more rapid fashion. The need is for comprehensive legislation to deal with the total spectrum of medical and legal aspects of
assisted conception and surrogacy, including paternity and support
issues. The child born in a surrogacy arrangement must be protected without regard to the validity of the contract; the adults in a
disputed surrogacy arrangement may well be able to fend for themselves but not so the child. The emotional reaction to such arrange-

276.

HuMAN FERTILIZATION AND EMBRYOLOGY AcT, 1990, ch. 37 (Eng.).
277. Id. Section 3 of this act requires a license to acquire, store, or use embryos. Id. § 3. Section 4 imposes the same requirement for the storage of use of
gametes. Id. § 4.
278. Id. §§ 28, 29 (speaking in terms of "placing" an embryo or sperm and in
terms of "insemination").
279. Id. § 30. Commercial surrogacy arrangements had previously been
criminalized by the Surrogacy Arrangements Act of 1985. See supra text ac-

companying notes 103-104.
280. The traditional nuclear family consisting of two adults (one male and

female) and one or more children conceived without medical assistance is in
rapid decline and will continue in that direction. See Claudia Wallis, The Nu-

clearFamily Goes Boom, TIME, Oct. 15, 1992, at 42-44 (discussing how the family
unit is changing an how it will change into the next century).
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ments, coupled with the sensationalism attached to several gonewrong surrogacy contracts, 28 ' cannot be completely ignored when
these issues are considered but any statutory enactment must provide the breadth of coverage to protect all innocent parties to any
assisted conception or surrogacy arrangement.
Whether surrogacy arrangements for compensation are to be
condemned or condoned is clearly an issue which has sharply divided the legislatures of many states and is a problem for each state
to resolve consistent with its individual public policy. Even in the
New Hampshire, 28 2 Virginia,28 3 and Victoria28 4 (Australia) statutes
which either declare surrogacy arrangements for compensation unenforceable or attach criminal sanctions to the paid arrangements,
the need to cover medically assisted conception procedures is
clearly recognized. Procedures used to promote the creation of children are at least as critical and in need of regulation as are procedures regulating the adoption of children. Yet, while the many
aspects of adoption are consistently regulated, few states have given
more than a brief passage to assisted conception and surrogacy. The
range of issues being presented in this field call for a regulatory act
similar to the Uniform Commercial Code with various technical
provisions providing a sound background for legal determinations.
The variety of issues within assisted conception and surrogacy need
medical identification and legal clarification. Even the most comprehensive of the statutes in the United States, the New Hampshire
Act, does not include issues relating to the storage of reproductive
cells and embryos, nor resolve issues similar to that posed in Tennessee by the dispute between wife egg donor and husband sperm
28 5
donor over custody of frozen embryos.
X.

FRAMEWORK FOR A PROPOSED SOLUTION

Since 1986, a number of model and uniform acts by various
authors and organizations have been proposed to resolve the conundrum of assisted conception procedures and surrogacy arrange281. In re Baby M, 525 A.2d 1228 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1987), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988) (discussing and deciding the case
based on a surrogacy contract); Yates v. Keane, (Gariot County Cir. Ct., 9758,
9772, Jan. 21, 1988); see also Powers, supra note 3, at 1C (discussing more disappointing results from a surrogacy contract). See also supra notes 119-225 and
accompanying text for another surrogacy contract that went wrong.

282. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B (Supp. 1992).
283. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-156, 20-165(A) (Michie Supp. 1992).
284.

VICTORIA INFERTILITY (MEDICAL PROCEDURES) ACT, 1984, No. 10163

(Austi.).
285. Davis v. Davis, No. 180, 1990 WL 130807 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990), aff'd, 842
S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992).
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ments. 286 None have met with more than minimal support. This
article has presented and discussed those acts, as well as the handful of judicial decisions in a historical and chronological fashion to
highlight the critical issues and point out the inadequacies of both
legislative and judicial attempts in groping with the complex and
high-tech facets of assisted conception, both for its own concerns
and as they relate to surrogacy contracts. These acts provide a solid
basis from which a solution might be achieved in the form of a Uniform Assisted Conception and Surrogacy Code.
It is not the purpose of this article to review in precise detail
each of those proposals, nor present an all-inclusive and exhaustive
list of all provisions to be included in a comprehensive legislative
enactment. However, a general framework for such legislation
should include the following categories of coverage. In Uniform
Commercial Code fashion, article numbers have been given for purposes of illustration although these numbers do not necessarily reflect a mandatory sequence. Of particular importance in an opening
article would be the definitions to be used under the statute. While
there has been some dispute among commentators as to the more
28 7
appropriate terminology for certain concepts and relationships,
agreement on definitions for Article I of the Proposed Assisted
Conception and Surrogacy Code should pose no great difficulty.
The Virginia statute provides an excellent example by defining "assisted reproduction" broadly to cover both those procedures already
in use and those yet to be discovered. 28 8 Article Two of the Proposed Assisted Conception and Surrogacy Code should identify limitations on the collection, storage and implantation of human
gametes and pre-embryos, including the need for licensing or other
approval by a state approved agency. Recent litigation and the potential for abuse provide ample reasons to carefully regulate the
care of those elements which may be later used to create human
life.28 9 Article Three should establish licensing and record-keeping
286. UNIF. STATUS AcT §§ 1-16, 9B U.L.A. 136-50 (Supp. 1993); Droft ABA
Model Surrogacy Act, supra note 187, at 123-43; Model Reproductive Act, supra
note 138, at 943-1013 (containing the Model Human Reproductive Technologies
and Surrogacy Act); Proposed Surrogacy Act, supra note 133, at 1283-329 (setting forth a proposed Uniform Surrogate Parenthood Act). In addition, acts

such as the Victoria Infertility (Medical Procedures) Act 1984, the Human Fertilization and Embryology Act 1990 on an international level and the Virginia
and New Hampshire legislation should be used as partial sources for a proposed
solution. See supra text accompanying notes 92, 220-252, and 277 for a discussion of these Acts.
287. See Annas , supra note 20, at 21-24 (arguing that the true surrogate is
the rearing mother).
288.

VA. CODE ANN. § 20-156 (Michie Supp. 1992).

289. See York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1989) (denying a motion to
dismiss a suit brought to release and transfer a pre-zygote from the defendant
to a hospital). See supra notes 138-45 and accompanying text for a discussion of
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requirements of the statute. 29° Issues of confidentiality and due
process in the licensing procedures would need to be addressed
either in this statute or by reference to other state legislation such
as a state administrative procedures act.
The rules of parentage where assisted conception procedures
and/or surrogacy arrangements have been utilized should be defined in Article Four.291 Again, reference may be made to existing
statutes, such as the Uniform Parentage Act or similar state legislation, but specific inclusion in this legislation would be preferable.
The issue of parentage in gestational surrogacy arrangements must
be addressed to deal with embryo transfer procedures. Non-genetic
surrogacy will continue to be favored where the social parents are
capable of providing the gametes (sperm and ova) for the embryo.2 9 2 Article Five should state the rights of and obligations toward a child born through assisted conception, including decisions
on health care, legitimacy, succession and support. The New Hampshire legislation and the Model Reproductive Act include this
293
topic.
Provisions on Artificial Insemination, including coverage of liability of sperm or ova donors and evaluations of donors, both medical and psychological, should be stated in Article Six. Several of the
more recent state acts on assisted reproduction establish mandatory
evaluation procedures. 294 Most states already have at least limited
295
statutes on artificial insemination.
Article Seven should detail standards for in vitro fertilization
and pre-embryo transfer. These provisions should include mandatory medical evaluation of both donor and recipient and counseling for the recipient as well as for her spouse, if she is married.
Eligibility for assisted conception programs must be spelled out if
several articles of the Model Reproductive Act, with Article 9 presenting a typical pattern of this type of regulation.
290. Model Reproductive Act, supra note 138, at 999-1013.
291. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-158 (Michie Supp. 1992); Model Reproductive
Act, supra note 138, at 955-59.
292. The procedure utilized may be one of in vitro fertilization followed by
implanting the embryo in the surrogate mother or using the GIFT or ZIFT
methods in allowing the egg to be fertilized after implantation of the sperm and
ovum. See supra notes 16 and 17 and accompanying text for a discussion of
these procedures.
293. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 168-B:6 to 168-B:9 (Supp. 1992); Model Reproductive Act, supra note 138, at 960-66.
294. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 168-B:14, 168-B:19 (Supp. 1992) (requiring medical examinations and the specifications for the examination); VA. CODE ANN.,
§ 20-160(B)(7) (Michie Supp. 1992) (requiring the intended parents, the surrogate, and her husband to submit to a physical and psychological examination).
295. Thirty-five states statutorily recognize the legitimacy of children who
were conceived through artificial insemination and corn to married couples.
See Note, supra note 2, at 1533.
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marital status or age limits are imposed. Although several states
have recently adopted legislation on in vitro fertilization and embryo transfer, most jurisdictions are lacking in even minimal cover296
age of conception techniques beyond artificial conception.
Article Eight on Surrogacy needs to initially address the general allowance or disapproval of surrogacy arrangements with the
clear distinction between arrangements for compensation and altruistic agreements. If the state will condone one type of surrogacy
arrangement, such as a gratuitous surrogacy, even while declaring
surrogacy contracts for compensation to be void and/or subject to
criminal sanctions, extensive details on such arrangements are
needed. These additional provisions would include requirements on
genetic testing, evaluations and counseling of the parties, petition to
and approval by the court of the agreement prior to implantation
attempts, and birth registration procedures. 297 The right of the surrogate to disavow the contract and keep the child, if available, must
be stated with any time and notice requirements. 298 Remedies for
breach of an approved surrogacy contract would also need to be addressed.299 If state law voids all surrogacy arrangements or attaches criminal sanctions to surrogacy contracts, issues of parentage
and support of any child born in a surrogacy arrangement are still
necessary aspects of the legislation.30 0 The acceptance of a compre296. Only four states (Illinois, Louisiana, New Hampshire and Pennsylvania)
have statutes specifically addressing facets of in vitro fertilization. Note, supra
note 2, at 1538.
297. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 168-B:17 to 168-B:28 (Supp. 1992) (spelling
out provisions for eligibility, nonmedical evaluation, medical evaluation, jurisdiction, hearing procedures, terms of a surrogacy contract, birth registration,
specific performance, and damages); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-159 to -165 (Michie
Supp. 1992) (setting forth provisions for controlling law, parentage of the surrogate child, surrogacy contracts, hearing procedures, regulations for the parent
and child, and surrogate brokers and penalties); Model Reproductive Act, supra
note 138, at 973-90 (spelling out provisions for regulatory procedures, eligibility,
judicial pre-authorization, mandatory terms of surrogate contract, specific performance, and damages); ProposedSurrogacy Act, supra note 133 (proposing a
Uniform Surrogate Parenthood Act).
298. UNIF. STATUS AcT § 6(b)(2), 9B U.L.A. at 142 (Supp. 1993); VA. CODE
ANN. § 20-161 (Michie Supp. 1992); N.H. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:25 (Supp. 1992).
299. The main concern is whether specific performance would be allowed for
breach of a surrogacy agreement. The Model Surrogacy Act allowed specific
performance under section 133(6)(c), but most statutes or proposed acts would
allow only limited damage. See Model Reproductive Act, supra note 138; VA.
CODE ANN. § 20-162 (Michie Supp. 1992); N.H. STAT. ANN. §168-B:28(II) (Supp.
1992).
300. N.H. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:8. (Supp. 1992) (setting forth a duty-of-support
provision). Because the thrust of this article is directed to the compelling need
for comprehensive legislation in all facets of assisted conception as well as in
surrogacy arrangements, the author has not assumed a judgmental position on
the manner in which surrogacy arrangements should be handled by the states.
The overriding concern for legislation on the subject, without reflecting the
manner of legislation, makes such commentary unnecessary. However, it is the
firm belief of the author that surrogacy arrangements, including those for com-

The John Marshall Law Review

[V7ol. 26:775

hensive statute on reproductive technology and its legal aftermath
should not be dependent upon a state's reaction to the surrogacy
issue alone. Alternative provisions on surrogacy would allow each
state to define its own public policy without destroying the scope of
the other articles on technology. 3° 1
Immunity for any health care providers or other persons who
participate in one or more of the medical or legal arrangements covered by the Act should be included. The New Hampshire statute
contains an example of an immunity clause for good faith participants in the medical procedures covered by the legislation. 30 2 The
final article would also include other housekeeping provisions such
as public health rules needed to regulate the licensing and evaluation processes created by the statute. New Hampshire places responsibility on the state health services division to regulate the
30 3
various aspects of the legislation as assisted reproduction.
CONCLUSION

The focal point for resolving assisted conception and surrogacy
disputes at a policy level lies in the state capitols and not in the
courts. An appropriate balance of legal authority would have the
courts placing a judicial stamp of approval on arrangements made
by consenting parties under provisions first articulated by the state
legislatures. The judicial process is poorly equipped to deal with
the comprehensiveness of conception and surrogacy problems.
Thus, the courts often resort to questionable analogies in resolving
the conflict. As Judge Radigan stated in the Baby GirlL.J. decision,
matters of public policy should be resolved by the legislature and
304
not by the courts.
We are now in a new generation of family development and
identification. Although adoption procedures will continue to propensation, should be statutorily condoned but carefully regulated in a scheme

similar to that presented by the Virginia and New Hampshire statutes. Judicial
approval, either before or following attempts at conception, is a sine qua non of
such enactments. A pre-birth window of time for a genetic surrogate to termi-

nate the agreement is no doubt an appropriate term of the agreement but the
court should still retain jurisdiction of the matter until after the child is born to
determine whether it is in the best interests of the child to remain with the
surrogate (and her husband) or grant custody to the intending father who has
provided the sperm.
301. See supra notes 194-209 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
legislature's alternative provisions that became the Uniform Status of Children
of Assisted Conception Act.
302. See N.H. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:29 (Supp. 1992) (establishing immunities to
possible civil and criminal liability as well as immunity for physicians and
health care providers).
303. Id. § 168-B:31.
304. In re Adoption of Baby Girl L.J., 505 N.Y.S.2d 813, 818 (N.Y. Surrogate's
Ct. 1986).
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vide one path for childless individuals and couples, a new and sometimes more promising path has been opened by medical technology.
It remains for the law, more particularly the legislative process, to
provide the appropriate legal guidance for that technology. Until
comprehensive legislation deals with all of the intricate issues in
facilitating reproduction and surrogacy, the courts will proceed to
slowly and painfully resolve those issues in an ad hoc and unsystematic process. Without extensive uniform legislation, the conflicting views found in the limited number of state statutes and
judicial decisions will continue to spawn new doubts and tribulations for individuals seriously interested in pursuing a surrogacy
305
arrangement.
In the Australian case of Mount Isa Mines, Ltd. v. Pusey,306
Justice Windeyer referred to "[l]aw, marching with medicine but in
the rear and limping a little." This comment appropriately identifies the approach now being used by the courts in resolving reproduction and surrogacy issues. The law is developing blisters on its
slow motion feet in an attempt to keep pace with medical technology. It need not be so. Resolution of the matter calls for a clear
understanding of the medical aspects of assisted reproduction, combined with the necessary regulations covering all of the technological facets and legal arrangements following the scientific
advancements. The opportunity now exists to bring the law along
side assisted reproduction technology. Some jurisdictions have already begun to reduce the distance between the two.307 The next
several years should resolve whether the lessons of the Baby M decision and the Malahoff-Stiver incident have been taken to heart or
whether the law on assisted reproduction and surrogacy will continue to "limp along in the rear" for another generation while
medicine continues its dramatic surge into the twenty-first century.

305. The use of adoption statutes as guiding law in the Baby M decision was

rejected in Calvert v. Johnson, 19 Cal. Rptr. 494 (Cal. 1993). "We are, accordingly, unpersuaded that the contact used in this case violates the public policies
embodied in... the adoption statutes." Id. at 502.

306. Mount Isa Mines, Ltd. v. Pusey, 125 C.L.R. 383 (1970) (Austl.).
307. The New Hampshire and Virginia enactments have moved to combine
assisted conception and surrogacy issues into a single legislative act. See supra

notes 215-236 and 238-252 and accompanying text for a discussion of the New
Hampshire and Virginia statutes.

